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Theory on credit risk valuation provides two main, market-oriented, but conceptually 
different streams: structural and reduced-form models. Structural models originated from the 
seminal work of Merton (1974) and were subsequently extended along several dimensions 
(Black and Cox, 1976; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Leland, 1994; Leland and Toft, 1996, 
etc.). The fundamental building block of this class of models and the primary source of 
uncertainty driving credit risk is the firm’s asset value dynamics. Corporate securities, debt 
and equity, are then valued as contingent claims on the underlying firm’s asset value assumed 
to evolve randomly through time with a given expected rate of return and volatility.  
A direct implication of these model assumptions is that structural models explicitly 
link default to the firm’s asset value (i.e. default will occur when the firm’s asset value 
becomes insufficient for servicing debt obligations) and provide a direct link between prices 
of equity and prices of other credit-related instruments (bonds, credit default swaps). Thus, 
from a theoretical perspective, structural credit risk models are attractive and allow for a 
broad range of practical application possibilities, such as, for example, extracting information 
on credit risk from information on stock prices. Their counterparts, reduced-form models, in 
contrast, lack this explicit endogenous link between default and the firm’s asset value and, 
therefore, cannot be used for certain practical applications that go beyond pricing.  
Traditional empirical implementation of structural models in the light of their ability 
to match market observable levels of credit spreads was not very successful (Jones et al., 
1984; Ogden, 1987; Lyden and Saraniti, 2001; Huang and Huang, 2003; Eom et al., 2004). 
However, theoretical completeness of structural models provoked researchers to focus on 




performance of structural models is indeed significantly influenced by employed estimation 
procedure. Namely, key determinants of default probabilities and credit spreads (firm’s asset 
value, volatility, and default barrier) are pure latent variables. If all liabilities of the firm were 
traded, estimation of crucial model parameters would be a straightforward task. In practice, 
this is not the case as only the price of equity, and in some cases a part of the debt, is directly 
observable.  
In the same time, rapid growth of credit derivatives market, a market where credit risk 
is explicitly traded, provided another measure of credit risk and an attractive benchmark 
alternative for testing the performance of structural models in addition to traditionally used 
corporate bond spreads. Credit default swap (CDS), the most liquid credit derivative which 
provides protection against the credit event by the particular reference entity became a 
preferable benchmark choice. The buyer of the protection pays a constant fee (i.e. CDS 
spread) which, by construction, should directly reflect the market perception of credit risk 
associated with the underlying reference entity (Longstaff, et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the use 
of CDS spreads as a “pure” credit risk benchmark has been seriously challenged with recent, 
subprime crisis events, revealing that liquidity should eventually be one of the most important 
non-default drivers of CDS spreads as suggested in the recent studies of Tang and Yan (2007) 
and Bongaerts et al. (2010). 
This thesis explores the information on credit risk embodied in the stock market and 
market for credit derivatives (CDS market) on the basis of structural credit risk models. It 
contains two empirical applications of this class of models that directly stem from the 
possibility to use structural models to obtain a directly comparable counterpart to CDS 
spreads - stock market implied credit spreads (ICSs). In addition, the thesis treats the crucial 




introducing a novel estimation procedure while empirically demonstrating its performance. 
The specific research questions are discussed further. 
The issue addressed in the first chapter refers to relative informational content of 
stock and CDS market in terms of credit risk. The overall analysis is focused on answering 
two crucial questions: which of these markets provides more timely information regarding 
credit risk, and what are the factors that influence informational content of credit risk 
indicators (i.e. stock market implied credit spreads and CDS spreads). Data set encompasses 
international set of 94 companies (40 European, 32 US and 22 Japanese) during the period 
2002-2004. The main conclusions uncover time-varying behaviour of credit risk discovery, 
stronger cross market relationship and stock market leadership at higher levels of credit risk, 
as well as positive relationship between the frequency of severe credit deterioration and the 
probability of the CDS market leadership.  
Second chapter concentrates on the problem of estimation of latent parameters of 
structural models. It proposes a new, maximum likelihood based iterative algorithm which, 
on the basis of the log-likelihood function for the time series of equity prices, provides 
pseudo maximum likelihood estimates of the default barrier and of the value, volatility, and 
expected return on the firm’s assets. The procedure allows for credit risk estimation based 
only on the readily available information from stock market (i.e. without relying on 
additional information from other credit-sensitive markets – bond market, or market for credit 
derivatives). It is demonstrated empirically that, contrary to the standard ML approach, the 
proposed method ensures that the default barrier always falls within reasonable bounds. 
Moreover, theoretical credit spreads based on pseudo ML estimates offer the lowest credit 
default swap pricing errors when compared to the other options that are usually considered 




default point, and principal value of debt. The obtained results in fact demonstrate that 
structural models are able to replicate observable CDS spreads quite well.  
Final, third chapter, provides further evidence of the performance of the proposed 
pseudo maximum likelihood procedure and addresses the issue of the presence of non-default 
components in CDS spreads. Specifically, the effect of demand-supply imbalance, as one 
important aspect of liquidity in the market where the number of buyers frequently outstrips 
the number of sellers, is analyzed. The data set is largely extended covering 163 non-financial 
companies (92 European and 71 North American) and period 2002-2008. In a nutshell, after 
controlling for the fundamentals reflected through theoretical, stock market implied credit 
spreads, demand-supply imbalance factors turn out to be important in explaining short-run 
CDS movements, especially during structural breaks. Results illustrate that CDS spreads 
reflect not only the price of credit protection, but also a premium for the anticipated cost of 






Credit Risk Discovery in the Stock and CDS Markets:             
Who Leads, When, and Why? 
1.1 Introduction 
Credit risk concerns almost all financial activities and, by definition, should be 
implicitly or explicitly reflected through market prices of credit sensitive claims, such as 
credit default swaps (CDSs), bonds and stocks. These assets are traded in structurally 
different markets, implying probable differences in the relative speed with which respective 
markets respond to changes in underlying credit conditions. Accordingly, the key issue arises: 
Which of these markets more rapidly and more efficiently reflects new information regarding 
credit risk? In an attempt to solve this riddle, recent empirical work has focused primarily on 
finding the market that leads the credit risk price discovery process. This literature suggests 
that the stock market more often leads the CDS and bond markets than vice versa (Norden 
and Weber, 2009; Forte and Peña, 2009) and that the CDS market tends to lead the bond 
market (Longstaff et al., 2003; Blanco et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006; Norden and Weber, 2009; 
Forte and Peña, 2009).  
This empirical evidence has typically been built upon cross-sectional analysis. Several 
studies suggest, however, that factors underlying credit risk discovery are, in fact, dynamic. 
There is a well documented positive relationship between the credit quality of a particular 
company and the liquidity of its stocks (Odders-White and Ready, 2006) and bonds 
(Longstaff et al., 2005). Furthermore, following the hypothesis of insider trading in credit 




and for companies that experience or are more likely to experience credit deterioration, 
information flows first into the CDS market and then into the more liquid stock market. In 
addition, Forte and Peña (2009) provide preliminary evidence that the informational content 
of CDS, bond, and stock markets, does change over time. In the light of these findings, two 
natural questions emerge. Are the relative market contributions to credit risk discovery time 
dependent? If so, what factors influence the relative informational dominance of competing 
markets? The aim of this chapter is to provide further insight into these basic questions, with 
a particular focus on the stock and CDS markets. 
In undertaking empirical analysis of credit risk discovery that involves stock and CDS 
markets, it is necessary to cope with the fact that CDS premia and stock prices represent 
remarkably different credit risk indicators. Market for credit derivatives, as the place where 
credit risk is explicitly traded, is expected to provide a “pure” measure of credit risk.1 In 
contrast, information regarding credit risk is reflected only implicitly through stock prices. As 
a result of such differences, two approaches for analyzing the credit risk discovery process in 
respective markets have been proposed. The standard approach (Longstaff et al., 2003; 
Norden and Weber, 2009) consists of relating stock returns and changes in CDS premia by 
means of a VAR model. The more recent approach (Forte and Peña, 2009) is based on using 
information on stock prices, along with a small number of accounting items, to derive the so-
called stock market implied credit spreads (ICSs) by means of a structural credit risk model. 
A VECM representation can then be used to relate CDS spreads and ICSs, as these two 
measures represent alternative proxies for the same latent variable: the pure credit spread.2  
                                                 
1 It may not be the case in practice if non-default components affect CDS premia (e.g. taxes, liquidity). Yet, 
CDSs are undoubtedly linked directly to the credit quality of the underlying reference entity and, despite its 
imperfections, are increasingly used in the literature as a directly observable market measure of credit risk 
(Blanco, et al., 2005; Longstaff et al., 2005; Ericsson et al., 2005) 
2 Such an approach has been regularly applied for investigating the informational content of CDSs and bonds 
(Blanco et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006; Norden and Weber, 2009) 
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Compared with the traditional use of stock returns, analysis based on ICSs presents 
several advantages. Changes in ICSs reflect not only changes in stock prices, but also 
changes in other variables (e.g. the risk-free rate) all of which are found to be important in 
determining credit spreads. ICSs also reflect the high non-linearity of the functional 
relationship between input variables and theoretical credit spreads. Furthermore, the potential 
long-run equilibrium relationship between stock and CDS markets can be taken into account 
by means of the corresponding VECM representation.  
In this chapter the approach based on ICSs is adopted, providing further evidence for 
the incremental information conveyed by ICSs in relation to traditionally used stock returns. 
In line with results provided by Norden and Weber (2009) on the basis of stock returns, it is 
also shown that the lower the creditworthiness of the reference entity, the stronger the 
relationship between ICSs and CDS spreads. The sample is taken from Alonso et al. (2008), 
and consists of CDSs and ICSs for 94 non-financial companies (40 European, 32 US, and 22 
Japanese) tracked during the period 2002-2004.3 Departing from this sample and assuming a 
time-varying framework, I analyze the credit risk discovery process in the stock and CDS 
market as well as factors underlying the relative informational dominance of respective 
markets. To summarize the main results, credit risk discovery in the stock and CDS markets 
proves to be a dynamic process, with slight informational dominance of the stock market, 
                                                 
3 The period considered seems to be particularly appropriate for the purposes of this study. It contains both a 
period of very high (2002-2003) and a period of very low (2003-2004) credit spread levels. Moreover, it avoids 
the recent financial turmoil when swap rates – the benchmark risk-free rate in credit markets (Blanco et al., 
2005; Longstaff et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006) – have lost their traditional highly liquid and risk-free profile. The 
extent to which swap rates with desirable characteristics are available will directly affect CDS premia and ICS 
estimates. Although there is no doubt about the interest in extending current analysis to the recent financial 
crisis, this would not merely require additional data, but would need financial modeling that accounts for both 
the lack of liquidity and the presence of credit risk in the interbank market as well. The development of such 
extensions is beyond the scope of this study. The analysis could also benefit from considering the bond market 
in addition to the stock and CDS markets. This extension, however, would probably be achieved at the cost of a 
substantial reduction in the number of companies in the final sample. By way of example, there are 18 non-
financial companies in Blanco et al. (2005). This is a reasonable reference for the potential number of 
companies in our sample, as the database on CDS premia in Blanco et al. (2005) is similar to the one in this 
study. Reduction in the number of companies is usually brought about by the lack of liquid bonds required to 
generate bond spread series that match the constant maturity of CDS premia (see also Zhu, 2006; Norden and 




which declined during the period under consideration. Analysis of factors underlying the 
relative markets’ dominance reveals that the probability of stock market leadership is 
positively related to the level of credit risk. This result complements rather than contradicts 
the argument of insider trading in credit derivatives. Specifically, a positive relationship 
between the frequency of severe credit deterioration shocks and the probability of the CDS 
market leading credit risk discovery is documented. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the CDS 
and ICS database. Section 1.3 addresses the advantages of using ICSs rather than stock 
returns. Preliminary evidence of a time-varying relationship between CDS spreads and ICSs 
is also provided. Section 1.4 presents and applies the methodology for credit risk discovery 
analysis. Section 1.5 examines the factors underlying credit risk discovery in a time-varying 
context, and Section 1.6 provides the main conclusions. 
1.2  Data  
1.2.1  Sample selection 
The initial data set on CDS spreads and ICSs corresponds to the final sample analyzed 
by Alonso et al. (2008), and includes 96 non-financial European, US, and Japanese 
companies, confined to the period 2001-2004. Daily CDS premia (mid bid-ask quotes), 
obtained from CreditTrade, refer to the close of business in London, New York, and Tokyo.4 
This sample includes only CDS contracts with 5-year maturity that are denominated in local 
currency: euro-denominated CDSs for 41 companies in the euro area, dollar-denominated 
CDSs for 32 US companies, and yen-denominated CDSs for 23 Japanese entities.5 
                                                 
4 Blanco et al. (2005), Zhu (2006), and Acharya and Johnson (2007), among others, have previously used the 
CreditTrade database. 
5 European entities not belonging to the single currency zone are excluded. 
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Furthermore, each company contains CDS data for at least two consecutive years, with a 
minimum of 150 observations per year.  
Alonso et al. (2008) derive implied credit spreads by considering the modified version 
of Leland and Toft’s (1996) structural credit risk model and the novel calibration 
methodology proposed by Forte (2008).6 In a nutshell, the firm asset value and volatility are 
consistently derived from equity prices, whereas the default barrier is calibrated from CDS 
premia.7 Additional inputs to the model are: short- and long-term liabilities, interest expenses, 
cash dividends, and 1-10 year local swap rates. Daily data on market capitalization (close of 
business) and 1-10 year local swap rates are obtained from Datastream. Required financial 
balance-sheet data are gathered from WorldScope. 
For comparison, two companies (one European and one Japanese) are excluded from 
the sample for lack of available credit rating. Data from 2001 is also excluded; CDS series 
satisfying the inclusion criteria are available for only eight companies in that year. In the first 
stage of the analysis the entire 2002-2004 sampling period is considered; in the second stage, 
the entire sample is divided into natural half-yearly periods. Thus, the additional restriction is 
imposed; no half-yearly period for a company is included unless a minimum of 50 daily 
CDS-ICS observations is available. The division by natural half-yearly periods seems to be 
optimal – sufficiently short to capture the dynamics of the factors underlying credit risk 
discovery and to address the issue of their consequent influence on the informational content 
                                                 
6 Forte's (2008) calibration methodology has previously been employed for the estimation of the ICS series in 
Forte and Peña (2009). 
7 A detailed description of the procedure is provided in the Appendix. However, it is worth noting here that the 
ICS estimations in Alonso et al. (2008) are performed in two steps. In the first step, the default point parameter – 
the default barrier-to-total debt ratio (DPP) – is assumed to be constant; in the second step, it is allowed to 
change every year. The data employed in this study follow from the assumption of a constant DPP. This 
alternative is clearly more appropriate for unit roots tests and cointegration analysis. Please note that these are 
not the values reported in Alonso et al. (2008), who provide results only from the second step estimation. It is 
also noteworthy that Forte and Peña (2009) have already shown that using CDSs for the calibration of the DPP 
does not substantially affect the final results; as long as this parameter remains constant, its value will affect 
only the general level of the ICS series, but not its short - or long-term dynamics. As a result, price discovery 
analysis is not materially affected by this value. It is worth nothing that Alonso et al. (2008) introduce the 
novelty of calibrating bankruptcy costs to reflect the historical recovery rate by sector. Again, this is a constant 




of stock and CDS markets between firm-periods, yet sufficiently long to allow for valid 
statistical conclusions within each firm-period observation.8  
In summary, the final sample used in this chapter contains daily data on CDS spreads 
and ICSs for 94 non-financial companies (40 European, 32 US, and 22 Japanese) tracked 
from 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2004. For each company, the number of half-yearly 
periods ranges from 4 to 6. In total, 480 firm-period observations are considered.9 
1.2.2  Descriptive statistics  
General descriptive statistics for CDS spreads and ICS series are depicted in Table 
1.1. For the entire sample, CDS spread level ranges around 72 bp, with an evident variation 
over various periods, ratings, and regions. The mean level of CDS spreads reached its 
maximum in 2002, with the peak occurring in the second half of the year (approximately 132 
bp). Nonetheless, subsequent periods demonstrate a clear downward trend. From the rating 
perspective, the average level of CDS spreads increases with lower rating categories, whereas 
the majority of CDS contracts (80.85%) refer to A and BBB rated issuers. Finally, CDS 
spreads are on average higher for US companies.  
Another important characteristic that deserves special attention is the time 
development of the average bid-ask spread depicted in Figure 1.1. Resembling the mean CDS 
spread level, the bid-ask spread peaked in the second half of 2002, reaching 23.73 bp on 
average and thereafter successively declined. As a reference, the last sub-period (second half 
of the year 2004) examined is characterized by an average bid-ask spread of just 7.94 bp. 
This patterned time evolution of the bid-ask spread could be associated with the rapid 
development of the CDS market: more players, increasing competition, higher liquidity, and 
                                                 
8 Due to the limited number of observations, division by natural quarters would make the econometric analysis 
questionable. A division on half-yearly periods is also considered in Forte and Peña (2009). 
9 The average number of daily observations is 631 per company and 123 per company-period. 
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contract standardization. Yet, the mean relative bid-ask spread in Figure 1.2, calculated as a 
percentage of the mid quote, does not reflect the same tendency.10 
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides general descriptive statistics for CDS and ICS series averaged over the period 2002-2004, 
region, and rating. 









                                                 
10 Sharp peaks in Figures 1 and 2 occur partly because trading days in the three markets (Europe, US, and Japan) 
do not match exactly. 
N firms Mean Median SD Bid-Ask Mean Median SD
2002 53 109.52 100.51 37.86 20.33 85.33 72.79 45.73
2003 94 74.70 69.29 23.58 14.30 106.93 100.38 38.97
2004 94 51.75 52.81 10.68 8.66 62.85 61.80 16.13
02/1 52 84.81 82.34 17.01 16.70 51.99 47.75 15.49
02/2 53 131.93 134.73 30.64 23.73 115.94 114.22 36.40
03/1 93 92.08 91.59 18.47 17.62 135.36 132.42 28.73
03/2 94 58.76 58.37 10.41 11.33 80.85 79.40 17.91
04/1 94 54.51 54.74 6.64 9.44 59.65 58.86 11.18
04/2 94 49.22 47.92 8.63 7.94 65.88 65.42 11.31
Euro 40 66.12 55.52 31.59 8.85 77.05 62.15 49.95
Dollar 32 101.06 89.21 41.34 20.76 116.82 109.89 52.69
Yen 22 40.45 33.64 20.50 10.48 45.08 34.33 28.60
AAA-AA 14 22.00 19.84 9.35 6.83 24.92 21.18 14.12
A 41 51.39 44.07 23.51 10.84 60.99 52.41 33.82
BBB 35 107.02 90.01 48.45 17.63 121.12 107.78 63.46
BB 4 151.95 145.06 61.75 23.03 180.86 135.04 127.13
All 94 72.00 61.87 32.31 13.29 83.11 71.89 45.89
























Derived ICS series follow the general pattern observed in the CDS market. For the 
entire sampling period, the average level of ICSs is around 83 bp, somewhat above the 
average level of CDS spreads. More formally, Table 1.2 exhibits standard immediate 
indicators of the pricing discrepancy between the ICS and CDS series: the average basis (avb) 
and the average absolute basis (avab). Mean values across all reference entities and periods 
are 11.1 and 32.85 bp, respectively.11 These numbers do not deviate appreciably from those 
in the literature when corporate bond spreads and CDS spreads are compared. Blanco at al. 
(2005), for example, report an average basis of 6 bp and an average absolute basis of 15 bp; 
Houweling and Vorst (2005) find an average absolute pricing error of 11 bp. Results in Zhu 
(2006) are even closer to those in my sample: an average basis of 15 bp and an average 
absolute basis of 29 bp. Likewise, observed variation across time, rating category, and 
economic region, is not an unexpected phenomenon. Again, the literature reveals similar 
patterns in bond and credit default swap spread differentials. As emphasized by Zhu (2006), 
price discrepancy during volatile periods can be large, while Blanco at al. (2005) find 
substantial differences between economic regions (US and Europe) and rating categories. 
                                                 












Credit Risk Discovery in the Stock and CDS Markets: Who Leads, When, and Why? 
 
 21
Table 1.2 Credit Spread Differentials between ICS and CDS Series 
 
This table provides mean and median values of the standard measures of credit spread differentials between ICS 
and CDS series: the average basis (avb) and the average absolute basis (avab). Measures of discrepancy are 
reported by period, region, and rating.  
 
1.3  Implied Credit Spreads vs. Stock Returns  
As noted in the introduction, the use of stock market implied credit spreads (ICSs) 
provides several advantages compared to the traditional use of stock returns. Implied credit 
spreads allow consideration of the eventual long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
two credit spread series. Likewise, they enable accounting for the effect of other relevant 
variables in addition to stock prices (e.g. the risk-free rate), while reflecting the highly non-
linear functional relationship between considered variables and credit spreads. In order to 
provide additional support for the argument that ICSs outperform stock returns typically used 
in the literature, I estimate the following models for changes in CDS spreads. 
  
N firms avb avab avb avab
2002 53 -24.20 46.79 -15.91 32.40
2003 94 32.23 39.60 21.62 24.37
2004 94 11.11 23.32 2.43 12.03
02/1 52 -32.91 42.35 -30.21 32.61
02/2 53 -15.99 51.07 -8.14 38.05
03/1 93 42.97 50.87 29.85 32.94
03/2 94 22.09 28.86 9.64 13.59
04/1 94 5.14 20.05 -0.21 11.36
04/2 94 16.65 26.40 7.73 12.77
Euro 40 10.94 30.99 5.09 22.61
Dollar 32 15.76 45.92 5.94 26.00
Yen 22 4.63 17.20 2.33 12.83
AAA-AA 14 2.92 10.57 2.33 9.64
A 41 9.60 25.40 3.27 20.87
BBB 35 14.10 46.11 8.18 33.02
BB 4 28.91 71.11 23.82 51.61
All 94 11.10 32.85 4.38 23.00







           ∆ , , ∆ , , ∆ , , . (1.1)
Model B:        
           ∆ , , , , ∆ , , . (1.2)
In Model A, changes in CDS spreads are regressed on contemporaneous and past 
changes in ICSs and on past changes in CDS spreads. As a counterpart, Model B takes 
contemporaneous and past stock returns into account rather than changes in ICSs. Following 
Acharya and Johnson (2007), the lag length of up to five days is imposed, which seems 
reasonable for capturing the overall information processing and transmission. Time-series 
regressions are estimated separately for each company in the sample. Average adj. R2 
statistics, depicted in Table 1.3, undoubtedly show that Model A has higher explanatory 
power than does Model B: 8.1% for Model A against 7.2% for Model B.12 These results 
suggest that ICSs contain certain incremental information as opposed to stock returns.13 
As a complementary analysis, Model C extends Models A and B by including 
contemporaneous and past changes in ICSs, along with contemporaneous and past stock 
returns. 
Model C:          
           ∆ , , ∆ , , , , ∆ , , . (1.3)
 
                                                 
12 Reported values are not particularly high, largely because I consider daily data. 
13 I also estimate a model that extends Model B to account for percentage changes in short- and long-term 
liabilities, interest expenses and cash dividends, and for changes in the 5-year swap rate. Results actually worsen 
as the adj. R2 falls to 6.8%. 
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Table 1.3 Adjusted R2 for A, B and C Model Specifications 
 
This table provides the average cross-sectional adjusted R2 statistics from individual time-series regressions for 
A, B, and C model specifications over the period 2002-2004. 
The following alternative hypotheses are tested: 
           , 0; 0,1, … ,5, (1.4)           , 0; 0,1, … ,5, (1.5)
Results, summarized in Table 1.4, indicate that in 25 out of 94 possible cases the null 
hypothesis that changes in CDS are independent of contemporaneous and past stock returns, 
is rejected. In contrast, the null hypothesis that changes in CDS are independent of 
contemporaneous and past changes in ICS is rejected in 41 cases. 
Table 1.4 Hypothesis Testing on Coefficients in Model C 
 
This table provides results from testing, in Model C, the null hypothesis that changes in CDS spreads are 
independent of contemporaneous and past changes in ICSs, and results from testing the null hypothesis that 
changes in CDS spreads are independent of contemporaneous and past stock returns. 
Previous research (Norden and Weber, 2009) suggests not only that the CDS market 
is sensitive to the stock market, but also that the magnitude of the sensitivity increases with 
the decrease in the creditworthiness of the reference entity. In order to provide additional 
evidence on this pattern, I analyze the strength of the relationship between stock and CDS 
markets by estimating Model A for different half-yearly periods. According to results in 
A B C
2002-2004 94 0.081 0.072 0.086
Period N f irms
adjusted R2
Rejections % Rejections %
2002-2004 94 25 26.60% 41 43.62%




Table 1.5, the explanatory power of the model decreases during the 2002-2004 period, 
reflecting the change in credit spread levels. More formally, the rank correlation between the 
adj. R2 statistic and the average CDS level – computed on a half-yearly basis and for the total 
sample of 480 firm-period observations – equals 0.45, and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The intersection by credit rating group leads to the same conclusion; the explanatory 
power evidently rises when moving from AAA-AA to BBB rating group.14 Overall, these 
results support the idea of a time-varying relationship between stock and CDS markets.  
Table 1.5 Explanatory Power and Credit Risk Level 
 
This table provides adjusted R2 statistics for Model A over the period 2002-2004 and over different rating 
categories, together with the corresponding mean and median levels of CDS spreads.  
 
                                                 
14 The BB rating group includes only four companies, not allowing for valid conclusions. 
2002 53 0.121 109.52 100.51
2003 94 0.076 74.70 69.29
2004 94 0.044 51.75 52.81
02/1 52 0.100 84.81 82.34
02/2 53 0.111 131.93 134.73
03/1 93 0.075 92.08 91.59
03/2 94 0.049 58.76 58.37
04/1 94 0.047 54.51 54.74
04/2 94 0.032 49.22 47.92
AAA-AA 14 0.042 22.00 19.84
A 41 0.089 51.39 44.07
BBB 35 0.094 107.02 90.01
BB 4 0.036 151.95 145.06
All 94 0.081 72.00 61.87
Median CDS
level
Period / Rating Mean CDS
level
N f irms Model A
adj R2
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1.4  Credit Risk Discovery 
1.4.1  Cointegration analysis 
Provided that stock and CDS markets price credit risk equally in the long-run, and as 
long as factors that differ from credit risk (e.g. liquidity considerations, measurement errors) 
do not affect ICS and CDS time series on a permanent basis, the two credit spread series 
should be cointegrated. At the same time, the common factor could be thought of as the 
implicit, unobservable efficient price of credit risk. 
We start by performing Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests for the presence of 
unit roots, where the corresponding number of lags is selected according to the Akaike 
Information Criterion. Results in Table 1.6 show that the null hypothesis – the level of the 
time series is non-stationary – is rejected at the 95% level for 26 companies in the case of 
CDS series and for 11 companies in the case of ICS series. Significant evidence of unit roots 
in both series is detected for 66 companies. In order to examine the eventual existence of 
cointegration between those ICS and CDS time series that simultaneously prove to be I(1), 
VAR-based Johansen Cointegration Test is applied.15 As indicated in Table 1.7, clear 
evidence of a cointegration relationship is found for 17 firms; for these entities it can be 
concluded that ICSs and CDS spreads are driven, in the long-run, by the same common 
factor.  
  
                                                 
15 According to Engle and Granger (1987), if two time series have unit roots, then their linear combination may 
be stationary. If this is the case, series are said to be cointegrated, where cointegrating equations may be 




Table 1.6 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests 
 
ADF unit root tests are performed for the three possible alternatives: without constant and trend in the series, 
with constant and without trend, and with constant and trend. Reported ADF test statistics correspond to the 
model with the lowest Schwarz Information Criterion, where the number of lags is determined according to the 
Akaike Information Criterion. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. Panel A lists the companies for which the presence of unit 
roots is rejected at the 95% level for at least one series. Panel B lists the companies for which the ADF test 
shows I(1) for both series simultaneously.  
 
t -stat p-val t -stat p-val
3 BASF AG -3.750 0.020 ** -0.980 0.293
6 BOUYGUES SA -3.187 0.002 *** -3.779 0.018 **
8 DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG -4.110 0.006 *** -0.500 0.499
11 ELECTRICIDADE DE PORTUGAL SA -2.431 0.015 ** -1.529 0.119
18 KONINKLIJKE KPN NV -1.480 0.130 -2.017 0.042 **
26 SAINT GOBAIN -3.976 0.000 *** -2.854 0.004 ***
28 STMICROELECTRONICS NV -3.335 0.001 *** -0.467 0.513
32 THALES SA -3.618 0.000 *** -0.898 0.327
33 THYSSENKRUPP AG -5.210 0.000 *** -1.018 0.278
36 VALEO SA -3.021 0.034 ** -2.719 0.229
45 CENTEX CORP -2.971 0.039 ** -1.373 0.158
61 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP -1.020 0.277 -2.352 0.018 **
62 OMNICOM GROUP -2.763 0.006 *** -0.961 0.301
68 TOYS R US INC -3.521 0.038 ** -2.419 0.137
72 WALT DISNEY CO, THE -2.368 0.017 ** -4.361 0.000 ***
74 CANON INC -2.666 0.008 *** -1.581 0.107
78 HITACHI LTD -1.963 0.048 ** -1.869 0.347
79 HONDA MOTOR CO LTD -27.033 0.000 *** 0.000 0.683
81 JAPAN TOBACCO INC -3.859 0.015 ** -4.046 0.008 ***
83 MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO LTD -2.635 0.008 *** -1.157 0.226
84 MITSUBISHI CORP -2.952 0.003 *** -2.096 0.035 **
85 MITSUI AND CO LTD -3.343 0.014 ** -2.753 0.006 ***
86 NEC CORP -3.941 0.000 *** -2.358 0.018 **
87 NIPPON STEEL CORP -3.587 0.000 *** -2.389 0.017 **
88 NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORP -3.741 0.000 *** -1.569 0.110
89 NTT DOCOMO INC -4.128 0.000 *** -0.416 0.533
92 SUMITOMO CORP -4.670 0.000 *** -2.049 0.039 **
94 TOSHIBA CORP -2.049 0.039 ** -1.111 0.242
Panel A
Company ID Company Name CDS ICS





t -stat p-val t -stat p-val
1 AKZO NOBEL NV -0.734 0.398 -0.830 0.356
2 ARCELOR -1.154 0.227 -0.929 0.314
4 BAYER AG -1.317 0.174 -1.313 0.175
5 BMW AG -0.721 0.405 -0.316 0.572
7 CARREFOUR SA -0.788 0.375 -0.178 0.622
9 DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG -1.300 0.179 -0.590 0.462
10 E.ON AG -0.646 0.437 -0.643 0.439
12 ENDESA -1.187 0.216 -1.127 0.237
13 ENEL SPA -0.715 0.407 -0.695 0.416
14 ENI SPA -1.128 0.236 -0.860 0.343
15 FINMECCANICA SPA -0.551 0.478 -2.677 0.079 *
16 FRANCE TELECOM -0.809 0.366 -0.952 0.304
17 HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG -0.599 0.458 -1.042 0.268
19 KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NV -1.032 0.272 -0.546 0.481
20 L AIR LIQUIDE SA -0.977 0.294 1.229 0.944
21 METRO AG -0.814 0.363 -1.355 0.163
22 NOKIA OYJ -0.819 0.361 -0.267 0.590
23 PEUGEOT SA -2.986 0.137 -0.475 0.510
24 RENAULT SA -1.506 0.124 -1.395 0.152
25 RWE AG -0.774 0.381 -0.985 0.291
27 SIEMENS AG -0.826 0.358 -1.124 0.238
29 STORA ENSO OYJ -1.022 0.276 -2.810 0.057 *
30 SUEZ SA -0.817 0.362 -1.084 0.253
31 TELEFONICA SA -1.009 0.281 -1.142 0.231
34 TOTALFINAELF SA -1.031 0.273 -0.488 0.505
35 UPM-KYMMENE OYJ -0.798 0.370 -2.060 0.261
37 VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT -1.693 0.086 * -1.849 0.062 *
38 VNU NV -1.290 0.182 -0.891 0.330
39 VOLKSWAGEN AG -2.851 0.052 * 0.668 0.860
40 WOLTERS KLUWER NV -1.027 0.274 -0.883 0.334
41 ALBERTSONS INC -1.286 0.183 -0.702 0.412
42 BELLSOUTH CORPORATION -1.213 0.207 -0.672 0.426
43 BOEING CO -1.085 0.252 -0.705 0.411
44 CATERPILLAR INC -1.885 0.057 * -1.209 0.208
46 CVS CORP -1.669 0.090 * -1.744 0.409
47 DEERE AND CO -1.370 0.159 -0.986 0.291
48 DELL COMPUTER CORP -1.535 0.117 -0.347 0.560
49 DELPHI CORP -0.332 0.566 0.117 0.719
50 DOW CHEMICAL CO, THE -1.006 0.283 -0.790 0.374
51 EASTMAN KODAK CO -1.292 0.182 -0.924 0.316
52 ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP -1.037 0.270 -0.944 0.307
53 FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES INC -1.202 0.211 -0.863 0.342
54 FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO -0.711 0.409 -1.747 0.407
55 GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORP -0.621 0.448 -0.503 0.499
56 GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORP -2.315 0.168 0.392 0.797
57 MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO -2.761 0.065 * -1.492 0.127
58 MAYTAG CORP 0.836 0.891 -0.329 0.567
59 NORDSTROM INC -1.563 0.111 -1.770 0.073 *
60 NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP -1.072 0.257 -1.005 0.283
63 SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC -1.196 0.213 -3.138 0.098 *
64 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO -1.124 0.237 -0.327 0.568
65 SPRINT CORP -1.002 0.284 -0.911 0.322
66 SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC -0.948 0.306 -2.585 0.097 *
67 TARGET CORP -0.772 0.382 -0.707 0.411
69 VERIZON GLOBAL FUNDING CORP -1.279 0.186 -0.884 0.333
70 VIACOM INC -1.574 0.109 -0.459 0.516
71 VISTEON CORP -2.546 0.105 -0.446 0.521
73 ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS CO LTD -1.255 0.193 -1.769 0.073 *
75 CHUBU ELECTRIC POWER CO INC -1.591 0.105 -1.342 0.167
76 DAIWA SECURITIES GROUP INC -1.529 0.119 -0.905 0.324
77 FUJITSU LTD -1.123 0.238 -0.595 0.459
80 JAPAN AIRLINES SYSTEM CORP -1.318 0.622 -1.158 0.225
82 KANSAI ELECTRIC POWER CO INC -1.339 0.168 -1.244 0.197
90 SHARP CORP -3.166 0.092 * -0.744 0.394
91 SONY CORP -1.644 0.095 * -0.258 0.593
93 TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER CO INC -1.088 0.251 -0.785 0.376
Panel B




Table 1.7 Johansen Cointegration Tests 
 
Johansen Cointegration Tests are performed for the 66 pairs of non-stationary ICS – CDS series. A constant is 
allowed both in the cointegration equation and in the VAR component of the VECM, whereas the number of 
lags is determined according to the Schwarz Information Criterion. Reported Trace Statistics correspond to the 
number of cointegration relationships between ICS and CDS series. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, 
** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.  
Trace stat Trace stat
1 AKZO NOBEL NV 10.565 1.227
2 ARCELOR 13.059 0.787
4 BAYER AG 19.517 ** 2.863 *
5 BMW AG 9.889 3.134 *
7 CARREFOUR SA 12.749 3.197 *
9 DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG 9.380 2.507
10 E.ON AG 12.661 1.910
12 ENDESA 37.630 *** 2.801 *
13 ENEL SPA 11.535 2.000
14 ENI SPA 7.904 3.206 *
15 FINMECCANICA SPA 10.035 2.126
16 FRANCE TELECOM 11.353 0.863
17 HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG 9.551 1.333
19 KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NV 9.112 1.267
20 L AIR LIQUIDE SA 5.494 0.051
21 METRO AG 23.970 *** 3.623 *
22 NOKIA OYJ 7.498 0.671
23 PEUGEOT SA 10.220 3.731 *
24 RENAULT SA 10.154 2.699
25 RWE AG 10.522 3.321 *
27 SIEMENS AG 8.464 1.683
29 STORA ENSO OYJ 16.789 ** 1.764
30 SUEZ SA 8.879 2.927 *
31 TELEFONICA SA 21.642 *** 1.779
34 TOTALFINAELF SA 9.729 2.926 *
35 UPM-KYMMENE OYJ 8.397 1.632
37 VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT 9.554 0.784
38 VNU NV 31.924 *** 3.260 *
39 VOLKSWAGEN AG 12.748 2.220
40 WOLTERS KLUWER NV 8.071 3.701 *
41 ALBERTSONS INC 7.761 1.542
42 BELLSOUTH CORPORATION 21.997 *** 2.505
43 BOEING CO 13.081 1.780
44 CATERPILLAR INC 23.051 *** 2.018
46 CVS CORP 10.796 * 2.804
47 DEERE AND CO 7.211 2.170
48 DELL COMPUTER CORP 10.386 2.957 *
49 DELPHI CORP 10.705 2.370
50 DOW CHEMICAL CO, THE 22.571 *** 0.821
51 EASTMAN KODAK CO 14.312 * 1.007
52 ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP 18.991 ** 1.055
53 FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES INC 7.517 2.210
54 FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO 14.186 * 2.659
55 GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORP 10.191 1.779
56 GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORP 8.773 2.793 *
57 MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO 17.984 ** 1.039
58 MAYTAG CORP 11.085 0.372
59 NORDSTROM INC 14.425 * 1.960
60 NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP 5.497 0.658
63 SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC 15.497 * 0.633
64 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO 8.779 3.697 *
65 SPRINT CORP 19.822 ** 1.238
66 SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 12.356 2.672
67 TARGET CORP 14.410 * 2.454
69 VERIZON GLOBAL FUNDING CORP 12.842 1.886
70 VIACOM INC 9.587 2.640
71 VISTEON CORP 39.264 *** 2.557
73 ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS CO LTD 13.284 1.884
75 CHUBU ELECTRIC POWER CO INC 11.626 0.308
76 DAIWA SECURITIES GROUP INC 6.587 0.652
77 FUJITSU LTD 17.922 ** 1.125
80 JAPAN AIRLINES SYSTEM CORP 11.895 1.243
82 KANSAI ELECTRIC POWER CO INC 19.272 ** 0.352
90 SHARP CORP 10.296 2.389
91 SONY CORP 16.284 ** 3.203 *
93 TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER CO INC 15.892 ** 1.310
At most 1Company NameCompany ID None
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In the presence of cointegration, the short-term dynamics between CDS spreads and 
ICSs is characterized by a VECM representation. Accordingly, the following two-
dimensional VECM is specified for the respective 17 companies: 
∆ Δ ∆  (1.6)
 ∆ Δ ∆  (1.7)
where, ε1 and ε2 are i.i.d. error terms, and the lag length p is determined according to 
the Schwarz Information Criterion. Loadings λ1 and λ2 represent the adjustment coefficients 
that measure the speed with which CDS spreads and ICSs adjust to eliminate ‘pricing errors’ 
– deviations from the long-run equilibrium. If λ1 is significantly negative, then ICSs adjust to 
eliminate pricing errors. A significantly positive λ2 implies, on the other hand, that CDS 
spreads adjust to eliminate pricing errors. If both coefficients are significant – and correctly 
signed – then both markets contribute to price discovery; their relative magnitude will 
determine which of these markets more rapidly absorbs and reflects new information about 
changes in the credit conditions of the underlying reference entity.  
Estimated λ1 and λ2 coefficients are presented in Table 1.8. For each firm there is at 
least one significant loading coefficient. Of the 17 entities, λ1 is significantly negative at the 
5% level for 11 names (ICSs adjust). The contrary effect (CDS spreads adjust), expressed 
through a significantly positive λ2, is supported for 12 companies. Moreover, strong one-way 
price adjustments of the CDS market to the stock market is evident in 6 cases; the reverse 
holds for 5 cases. Both coefficients are correctly signed and significant in 6 cases. At first 
glance, and according to the significance and correctly signed factor loadings, it seems that 




Table 1.8 Measures of Contribution to Price Discovery 
 
This table reports alternative measures of the stock and CDS market contribution to price discovery (λ1, λ2, GG, 
and Hasbrouck measures) for the companies for which a cointegration relationship has been detected. Estimated 
λ1 and λ2 coefficients are presented, along with the corresponding t-values. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.  
More formally, Gonzalo and Granger (1995), and Hasbrouck (1995), introduced two 
alternative measures of a single market contribution to price discovery. Gonzalo and 
Granger’s (GG) measure is based on the ratio between the two factor loadings, defined as  
. (1.8)
In the particular case analyzed in this chapter, the higher the GG measure, the higher 
the stock market contribution (the lower the CDS market contribution) to price discovery. 
Nevertheless, the GG measure may sometimes exceed 1 or be below 0. If GG ≥
 
1, then the 
stock market clearly dominates the CDS market in price discovery. For GG ≤
 
1 the inverse 
situation holds. In the case of the 17 examined entities, the GG measure supports CDS market 
leadership for 11 companies, whereas the reverse appears to be true for only six companies. 
Furthermore, the average GG measure for all the companies considered is 0.48, suggesting a 
Lower Upper Mid
BAYER AG 0.013 0.600 0.078 4.061 *** 1.20 0.98 0.99 0.98
ENDESA -0.041 -3.379 *** 0.032 4.257 *** 0.43 0.51 0.68 0.59
METRO AG 0.002 0.157 0.018 4.400 *** 1.11 0.95 1.00 0.97
STORA ENSO OYJ -0.016 -2.261 ** 0.007 2.039 ** 0.30 0.39 0.52 0.46
TELEFONICA SA -0.022 -1.984 ** 0.021 2.894 *** 0.49 0.42 0.80 0.61
VNU NV -0.040 -3.167 *** 0.009 0.773 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.12
BELLSOUTH CORPORATION -0.046 -3.684 *** -0.015 -2.595 *** -0.46 0.31 0.34 0.33
CATERPILLAR INC -0.007 -1.359 * 0.009 3.514 *** 0.57 0.77 0.89 0.83
DOW CHEMICAL CO -0.038 -2.936 *** 0.034 3.245 *** 0.48 0.48 0.61 0.54
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP -0.004 -0.402 0.041 4.085 *** 0.92 0.92 0.99 0.96
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO -0.014 -1.947 * 0.010 2.904 *** 0.41 0.69 0.69 0.69
SPRINT CORP -0.044 -3.280 *** 0.019 0.829 0.29 0.04 0.43 0.23
VISTEON CORP -0.002 -0.158 0.053 6.094 *** 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.99
FUJITSU LTD -0.009 -2.489 ** 0.029 3.093 *** 0.76 0.57 0.63 0.60
KANSAI ELECTRIC POWER CO INC -0.038 -3.975 *** 0.009 1.859 * 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18
SONY CORP -0.018 -3.357 *** -0.005 -1.748 * -0.40 0.14 0.23 0.19
TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER CO INC -0.029 -3.780 *** 0.003 0.464 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02
Average -0.02 0.02 0.48 0.49 0.60 0.55
Company Name λ1 GG  
Hasbrouck
λ2t -stat t-stat
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slight dominance of the CDS market in price discovery during the entire 2002-2004 sample 
period.16 
Alternatively, Hasbrouck (1995) proposed the model of information shares, which 
assumes that the market that contributes more to the variance of innovations in the implicit 
unobservable efficient price (i.e. the common factor implied by cointegration) is 
informationally dominant and contributes more to price discovery. The information share of a 
given market is therefore determined by the proportion of the innovation variance that can be 
attributed to that market. When innovations are correlated, Hasbrouck suggests lower (HL) 
and upper (HU) limits for market shares: 
            2  ;          2  ; (1.9)
where σ1, σ2, and σ12, are the elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
residuals from the VECM specification. The mid-Hasbrouck measure (HM), calculated at the 
midpoint of the lower and upper bound, is usually taken as an adequate measure of a single 
market contribution to price discovery (Baillie et al, 2002). According to this measure, the 
stock market dominates in 10 cases, the CDS market dominates in 7 cases, and the average 
for all the entities examined amounts to 0.55, signifying a slight dominance of the stock 
market in price discovery.  
Contrasting average GG and HM measures over the entire sampling period implies 
that both markets contribute approximately equally to price discovery; both measures are 
close to 0.5, and no clear conclusion can be made regarding which of the markets is more 
informationally efficient. Repeating the same exercise in a time-varying context, however, 
provides a more detailed picture of the price discovery process. Half-yearly loadings for each 
                                                 




company and period, reported in Table 1.9, are estimated by imposing the entire sample 
cointegrating vector to the restricted time intervals. As for the entire sample, the analysis 
reveals no leadership concentration in either of the markets; however, it does reveal a 
downward trend in the information share of the stock market with respect to the CDS market. 
At the beginning of the sampling period (first half of 2002), the HM (GG) measure for the 
information share of the stock market was relatively high: approximately 0.67 (0.63). A much 
smaller proportion of price discovery can be attributed to this market, however, in the second 
half of 2004: approximately 0.46 (0.37).  
Table 1.9 Measures of Contribution to Price Discovery over Half-Yearly Periods 
 
This table reports GG and Hasbrouck measures of the stock and CDS market contribution to price discovery 
process over the corresponding half-yearly periods. For the sake of brevity, the table presents only the mean 
level of the individual values estimated for the companies for which the cointegration relationship has been 
detected by the Johansen Cointegration Test over the entire sample period. Half-yearly coefficients are 
estimated by imposing the entire sample cointegration equation on the half-yearly VECM. 
1.4.2.  Granger causality 
For the sub-sample of 77 entities that either do not have unit roots, or for which the 
cointegration is rejected, the VECM approach is not valid. Price leadership is tested in these 
cases by the presence of Granger causality in a VAR model of the form: 
             ∆ Δ ∆ , (1.10)
 
Low er Upper Mid
02/1 12 0.63 0.61 0.72 0.67
02/2 12 0.49 0.44 0.63 0.54
03/1 17 0.41 0.43 0.56 0.50
03/2 17 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.47
04/1 17 0.43 0.52 0.59 0.56
04/2 17 0.37 0.44 0.50 0.46
All 92 0.46 0.48 0.59 0.53
GG HasbrouckN f irmsPeriod
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            ∆ Δ ∆ , (1.11)
where ε1 and ε2 are i.i.d. error terms, and p is the number of lags determined according to the 
Schwarz Information Criterion. The Granger Causality Test is not aimed at revealing the 
causality pattern between the considered series, but does yield information regarding the 
price formation dynamics and information precedence. It actually tests whether coefficients 
of the lagged changes in CDS spread levels are statistically significant, and help in the 
explanation of the current changes in ICSs (and vice versa). 
F-statistics for the corresponding Wald Tests are presented in Table 1.10. The null 
hypothesis that changes in ICSs do not Granger-cause changes in CDS spreads is rejected at 
the 95% significance level for 47 companies (61.04% of the sub-sample of 77 names). In 
contrast, the null hypothesis that changes in CDS spreads do not Granger-cause changes in 
ICSs is rejected for only 16 companies (20.78%). Furthermore, a one-way influence of the 
stock market (∆ICS do Granger-cause ∆CDS, but ∆CDS do not Granger-cause ∆ICS) is 
detected for 36 companies, whereas the opposite is true just for 5 entities. Overall, it seems 
that lagged changes in ICSs are important in explaining current changes in CDS spreads more 
often than the other way around, which may suggest the dominance of the stock market in 
credit risk discovery over the entire 2002-2004 sampling period. These results are not 
surprising; the literature has already uncovered similar patterns when considering stock 
returns (Norden and Weber, 2009).17  
  
                                                 




Table 1.10 Granger Causality Tests 
 
The table reports pairwise Granger Causality Test statistics (dngc = does not Granger cause) for the sub-sample 
of 77 companies that either a) do not have unit roots or b) the cointegration relationship is not distinctly 
suggested by the Johansen Cointegration Test. The number of lags is selected according to the Schwarz 
Information Criterion. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
F -statistic F -statistic
AKZO NOBEL NV 7.564 *** 0.180
ARCELOR 4.215 ** 1.725
BMW AG 4.119 ** 10.870 ***
CARREFOUR SA 18.914 *** 1.431
DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG 25.560 *** 0.473
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG 30.926 *** 3.454 *
E.ON AG 14.411 *** 0.884
ELECTRICIDADE DE PORTUGAL SA 6.580 ** 0.176
FINMECCANICA SPA 15.223 *** 0.153
FRANCE TELECOM 23.229 *** 2.849 *
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG 3.944 ** 0.931
KONINKLIJKE KPN NV 25.340 *** 4.818 **
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NV 5.600 ** 2.824 *
L AIR LIQUIDE SA 0.700 5.373 **
NOKIA OYJ 10.546 *** 1.314
PEUGEOT SA 21.850 *** 1.920
RENAULT SA 11.141 *** 0.210
RWE AG 28.656 *** 0.445
SAINT GOBAIN 4.115 *** 6.067 ***
SIEMENS AG 46.190 *** 0.000
STMICROELECTRONICS NV 4.446 ** 1.022
SUEZ SA 18.314 *** 0.359
THALES SA 5.326 ** 0.461
THYSSENKRUPP AG 1.471 21.046 ***
VALEO SA 9.868 *** 19.096 ***
VOLKSWAGEN AG 36.913 *** 1.107
BOEING CO 19.885 *** 10.075 ***
DEERE AND CO 4.075 ** 4.092 **
EASTMAN KODAK CO 62.310 *** 0.002
FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES INC 37.829 *** 0.004
FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO 95.236 *** 0.362
GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORP 15.567 *** 0.532
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORP 25.942 *** 0.045
MAYTAG CORP 10.853 *** 5.288 **
NORDSTROM INC 4.201 ** 0.319
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP 6.805 *** 1.693
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 1.659 3.002 ***
SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC 10.280 *** 3.357 *
SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 19.407 *** 0.023
TARGET CORP 28.335 *** 5.073 **
TOYS R US INC 7.346 *** 1.614
VERIZON GLOBAL FUNDING CORP 22.789 *** 5.586 ***
WALT DISNEY CO, THE 10.619 *** 0.035
DAIWA SECURITIES GROUP INC 4.552 ** 4.773 **
HITACHI LTD 5.745 *** 0.300
JAPAN AIRLINES SYSTEM CORP 1.982 * 3.754 ***
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO LTD 8.039 *** 2.747 *
NIPPON STEEL CORP 1.002 2.788 **
NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORP 8.625 *** 2.423
NTT DOCOMO INC 2.830 ** 2.390 *
SHARP CORP 6.235 ** 4.975 **
TOSHIBA CORP 6.521 ** 2.464
Company Name ∆CDS dngc ∆ICS∆ICS dngc ∆CDS
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In order to determine if these findings are stable over time, I perform the same 
analysis by natural half-yearly periods; Results are presented in Table 1.11. Again, the null 
hypothesis – ∆ICS do not Granger-cause ∆CDS – is rejected more frequently than vice versa. 
The informational precedence of the stock market, however, appears to diminish over the 
period considered (measured by the proportion of the null hypothesis rejections in the total 
number of examined companies), in line with results from the VECM analysis.  
Table 1.11 Granger Causality Tests over Half-Yearly Periods 
 
The table reports the number and percentage of firms for which the corresponding Granger Causality Test 
statistic is significant at the 5% level, over each of the considered half-yearly periods.    
1.5  Factors Underlying Credit Risk Discovery 
In this section, I extend previous analysis by investigating factors that may influence 
the informational dominance of the stock and CDS markets. As it has been shown, the 
relative contribution of these markets to credit risk discovery differs not only between 
companies, but also within the same company across different periods. Thus, I depart from 
results obtained in the analysis of half-yearly periods. Regarding potential factors, and in the 
light of the existing literature and my own findings, I consider the following: liquidity of the 
CDS and stock markets, credit quality of the reference entity, presence of significant negative 
shocks, and time period. A detailed description follows. 
N firms % N firms %
02/1 40 13 32.50 3 7.50
02/2 41 18 43.90 1 2.44
03/1 76 20 26.32 10 13.16
03/2 77 14 18.18 7 9.09
04/1 77 14 18.18 5 6.49
04/2 77 12 15.58 7 9.09
All 388 91 23.45 33 8.5




CDS percentage bid-ask spread. Liquidity is an obscure concept and there is no one, 
universally accepted liquidity measure. The literature has considered many different 
alternatives, with the percentage bid-ask spread being one of the most commonly used. We 
therefore use the average percentage bid-ask spread (calculated relative to the mid quote) 
over the corresponding half-yearly period. It appears natural to presume that the higher the 
CDS market liquidity, the higher its contribution to credit risk discovery. As a result, a 
negative relationship between this illiquidity measure and the CDS market leadership is 
expected.  
Stock turnover ratio. Turnover ratio shows how actively the stock is being traded. It 
is defined as the number of shares traded, adjusted by the number of shares outstanding – the 
turnover volume over market capitalization. This proxy for the stock market liquidity seems 
suitable for international sample considered in this study, as it is a unitless measure that 
allows direct comparison over time and geographical regions. Following the notion that the 
more actively the stock is being traded, the more information revelation should occur in the 
stock market, a positive relationship between this liquidity measure and the stock market 
leadership is expected. For a single half-yearly observation, the average turnover ratio over 
the corresponding half-yearly period is used.  
Relative frequency of adverse shocks. CDS contracts, as a form of insurance, are 
subject to moral hazard and asymmetric information risk, especially considering that major 
participants in the market are primarily insiders (banks, insurance companies, hedge funds). 
Acharya and Johnson (2007) have shown that information revelation in the CDS market is 
asymmetric, consisting exclusively of bad news. Accordingly, it is expected that the 
information share of the CDS market will be positively related to the presence of negative 
and severe credit events. In line with previous study, I approximate the severity of credit 
deterioration by the relative frequency of adverse shocks, defined as the number days with an 
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increase in the CDS level of more than 50 bp relative to the total number of days within the 
specific half-yearly period.  
Credit condition. We have already seen that the lower the credit quality of the 
underlying reference entity, the higher the strength of the relationship between the stock and 
CDS markets. It seems suitable to test if the overall credit risk level also affects the relative 
informational dominance of considered markets. In order to achieve higher robustness in the 
results, I perform three alternative analyses using rating, mean CDS spread level, and a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the mean CDS spread level surpasses 100 bp. 
Credit ratings are defined numerically with values ranging from 35 for AAA issuers to 23 for 
BB issuers, in line with Odders-White and Ready (2006). Considered ratings correspond to 
those at 30 June 2003, which represents exactly the middle of the sampling period.18  
Trend of the CDS premia. We introduce this variable as a reasonable complement for 
the information provided by credit condition. It is defined as the slope of the characteristic 
line over the corresponding half-yearly period. A positive sign of the slope indicates an 
upward trend in the CDS level and vice versa.  
Time effect. The period 2002-2004 is characterized by a substantial time effect: it 
captures the rapid expansion of the CDS market in size and standardization, especially since 
2003. We control for the substantial time effect through the introduction of two dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 for year 2002 and year 2004, respectively, and 0 otherwise 
(year 2003).19 As the CDS market is maturing, it is expected year 2002 to have a negative 
effect (relative to year 2003) on the information share of the CDS market. Similarly, a 
positive effect for year 2004 is expected. 
  
                                                 
18 Consequently, there is no time variation in this instance. 
19 Standard errors clustered by firm are in the level of White standard errors; therefore, I only control for the 




Table 1.12 shows the correlation matrix between relevant variables.  
Table 1.12 Correlation Matrix between Relevant Variables 
 
In the first stage of the analysis, I consider only companies for which a cointegration 
relationship between ICS and CDS series has been detected. Results from the analysis of 
half-yearly periods provide estimates of information shares for 92 firm-period observations. 
Although both GG and Hasbrouck’s measures are commonly used in the literature (e.g. 
Blanco et al., 2005), the GG measure may fall out of the 0-1 range, and is completely 
determined by the estimated factor loadings. In contrast, Hasbrouck’s measures are, by 
definition, always in the 0-1 range, simultaneously accounting for the variance-covariance 
matrix of the VECM residuals and, consequently, containing more information. Following 
Baillie et al. (2002), in the remainder of the study I use only the mean of the upper and lower 
Hasbrouck bounds (HM). Table 1.13 depicts HM information shares in terms of the stock 
market contribution to price discovery. These information shares are used as the dependent 
















% CDS bid-ask spread 1.000
Stock turnover ratio -0.193 1.000
Frequency of adverse shocks -0.088 0.203 1.000
Credit rating 0.426 -0.189 -0.178 1.000
Average CDS level -0.359 0.247 0.569 -0.486 1.000
CDS>100 -0.312 0.213 0.355 -0.461 0.761 1.000
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Table 1.13 Mid-Hasbrouck Information Shares over Half-Yearly Periods 
 
This table reports Mid-Hasbrouck (HM) information shares in terms of stock market contribution to price 
discovery over the half-yearly periods. Half-yearly information shares are estimated by imposing the entire 
sample cointegration equation on the half-yearly VECM. 
Results from OLS regressions with White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
are summarized in Table 1.14. It seems that, despite its parsimony, the proposed econometric 
framework is capable of revealing significant determinants of information shares. To be 
precise, the set of factors considered explains approximately 30% of the variation in HM 
information shares. The information share of the stock market proves to be significantly 
influenced by the stock turnover ratio, the credit condition of the underlying reference entity, 
and the relative frequency of negative shocks. As expected, an increase in the stock turnover 
ratio implies a higher information share for the stock market. Rating, expressed numerically 
(i.e. a higher credit quality corresponds to a higher numerical score), seems to have a negative 
effect on the stock market share. This finding is corroborated with a significant positive 
influence of the CDS level. Finally, and consistent with the initial hypothesis, the presence of 
02/1 02/2 03/1 03/2 04/1 04/2
BAYER AG 0.93 0.40 0.04 0.16
ENDESA 0.78 0.82 0.30 0.82 0.46 0.89
METRO AG 0.67 0.64 0.11 0.97 0.76 0.99
STORA ENSO OYJ 0.98 0.77 0.11 0.62 0.84 0.55
TELEFONICA SA 0.92 0.51 0.16 0.25 0.40 0.14
VNU NV 0.70 0.26 0.83 0.17 0.10 0.30
BELLSOUTH CORPORATION 0.32 0.10 0.22 0.19
CATERPILLAR INC 0.99 0.84 0.63 0.14 0.95 0.95
DOW CHEMICAL CO 0.31 0.56 0.91 0.65 0.90 0.29
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP 0.95 0.94 0.72 0.95
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO 0.99 0.82 0.75 0.44
SPRINT CORP 0.43 0.59 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.00
VISTEON CORP 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.97
FUJITSU LTD 0.96 0.96 0.87 0.99 0.99 0.59
KANSAI ELECTRIC POWER CO INC 0.56 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.59 0.44
SONY CORP 0.66 0.36 0.02 0.01 0.61 0.03
TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER CO INC 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01





credit deterioration shocks positively influences the information share of the CDS market. 
The coefficients for the remaining regressors are not statistically significant.  
Table 1.14 Regression Estimation Results 
 
This table summarizes estimates from the OLS regression, where t-statistics correspond to the White 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at 
the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
For the sub-sample of 77 companies for which unit roots are not simultaneously 
detected in ICS and CDS spread series, or for which a cointegration relationship is not 
supported by the Johansen Cointegration Test, the analysis is replicated in an ordered probit 
framework. Results from Granger Causality Tests actually allow us to define a discrete 
dependent variable, and make the distinction between three naturally ordered, mutually 
exclusive states:  
• -1 if a strict leadership of the CDS market is suggested by the Granger Causality Test (i.e. 
changes in CDS spreads Granger cause changes in ICSs but not the other way around); 
• 0 if there is an unclear interpretation;  
coef t- stat coef t -stat coef t -stat
c 2.042 ** 2.555 0.193 1.267 0.186 1.243
CDS % bid-ask spread 0.002 0.593 -0.002 -0.611 -0.002 -0.648
Stock turnover ratio 0.731 *** 3.698 0.716 *** 3.316 0.789 *** 3.665
Frequency of adverse shocks -0.109 *** -2.979 -0.151 *** -4.759 -0.104 *** -3.709
Credit condition
Credit rating -0.066 ** -2.297
Average CDS level 0.001 *** 3.485
CDS>100 0.173 * 1.965
CDS level trend -0.006 -0.142 0.063 1.332 -0.019 -0.470
Dummy variables
2002 0.060 0.777 0.019 0.246 0.049 0.593
2004 0.082 0.965 0.075 0.887 0.109 1.329
R2 0.330 0.310 0.294
adj R2 0.273 0.251 0.234
F -statistic 5.836 5.316 4.929
Prob(F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Explanatory variables OLS estimates
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• +1 if a strict leadership of the stock market is suggested by the Granger Causality Test 
(i.e. changes in ICSs Granger cause changes in CDS spreads, but not the other way 
around); 
Estimates from ordered probit regressions, performed on the basis of 388 half-yearly 
observations, are presented in Table 1.15. As the results show, the likelihood ratio statistics 
(LR) are highly significant, whereas the Pseudo-R2 ranges from 0.056 to 0.080.20 At first 
glance, some of the regression coefficients seem puzzling, when either the credit rating or a 
dummy variable for the mean CDS spread level above 100 bp are used as a proxy for credit 
condition. The CDS percentage bid-ask spread appears to be negatively related to the 
probability of stock market leadership, whereas credit condition exhibits weak (dummy) or 
null (rating) significance. It is noteworthy that a poorer credit condition and a higher CDS 
percentage bid-ask spread are negatively related in the sample considered in this study (see 
Table 1.12), a result already documented by Chen, et al. (2005). It seems, therefore, that in 
this instance considering either credit rating or a dummy variable as alterative proxies for 
credit condition generates a multicolinearity problem. The model that provides more 
meaningful results is the one that accounts for the credit condition by means of the average 
CDS level; furthermore, this is the model with the highest level of significance (LR statistic 
of 45.408 and Pseudo-R2 of 0.080). Again, the presence of a severe deterioration in the credit 
quality of the underlying issuer negatively influences the probability of the stock market 
leadership. Still, a higher overall creditworthiness positively affects this probability. Different 
variables actually confirm this finding, as not only the mean CDS spread level shows a 
positive relationship to the probability of stock market leadership, but the CDS trend also 
points in the same direction. In contrast, neither the CDS percentage bid-ask spread nor the 
                                                 
20 These values may appear low; however, I am dealing with discrete models in which this measure is of 





stock turnover ratio seem to have any significant influence on the information shares. It turns 
out that the probability of the stock market leadership is highly associated with the year 2002, 
in line with the initial hypothesis.  
Table 1.15 Ordered Probit Estimation Results for the Sub-Sample of 77 Companies 
 
This table reports the ordered probit estimation results for the sub-sample of 77 companies that either do not 
have unit roots, or for which a cointegration relationship is not distinctly suggested by the Johansen 
Cointegration Test. The dependent variable takes the value of -1 for the clear CDS market leadership, the value 
of 0 for the situation in which no clear interpretation can be made, and the value of +1 for the clear stock market 
leadership in credit risk discovery. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
In order to enhance previous analysis, I apply the ordered probit framework to the 
entire sample containing 480 half-yearly observations. Specifically, I merge two approaches 
that, on a complementary basis, indicate the relative informational dominance of the stock 
and CDS markets and, at the bottom, lead to three possible, mutually exclusive situations: a) 
clear stock market leadership in credit risk discovery, b) clear CDS market leadership, and c) 
a situation in which no obvious interpretation can be made. Consequently, I introduce three 
dummy variables that take the value of:  
coef z- stat coef z- stat coef z- stat
% CDS bid-ask spread -0.017 *** -3.017 -0.007 -1.221 -0.013 ** -2.496
Stock turnover ratio 0.353 1.528 0.273 1.177 0.312 1.357
Frequency of adverse shocks -0.389 ** -1.973 -1.033 *** -4.018 -0.525 ** -2.507
Credit condition
Credit rating -0.007 -0.211
Average CDS level 0.006 *** 3.940
CDS>100 0.346 * 1.830
CDS level trend 0.192 1.101 0.507 *** 2.645 0.277 1.548
Dummy variables
2002 0.547 *** 3.035 0.474 *** 2.626 0.487 *** 2.709
2004 -0.092 -0.615 -0.058 -0.387 -0.105 -0.705
Log likelihood -264.889 -260.292 -266.574
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.080 0.058
LR  stat - χ27 31.212 45.408 32.844
Prob(LR  stat)   0.000 0.000 0.000
Explanatory variables Ordered probit estimates 
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• -1 if either the VECM or the Granger Causality Test, whichever is appropriate, suggests a 
strict leadership of the CDS market. In the case of ICS and CDS spread series being 
cointegrated, this value will be associated with the situation in which loading factor λ1 is 
significantly negative, while λ2 has no statistical significance (i.e. only ICSs adjust to 
eliminate pricing errors); and, in the case of ICS and CDS spread series not being 
cointegrated, this value will be associated with the situation in which changes in CDS 
spreads Granger cause changes in ICSs, but not the other way around; 
• 0 if there is unclear interpretation;  
• +1 if either the VECM or the Granger Causality Test, whichever is appropriate, suggests a 
strict leadership of the stock market. In the case of ICS and CDS spread series being 
cointegrated, this value will be associated with the situation in which loading factor λ2 is 
significantly positive, while λ1 has no statistical significance (i.e. only CDS spreads adjust 
to eliminate pricing errors); and, in the case of ICS and CDS spread series not being 
cointegrated, this value will be associated with the situation in which changes in ICSs 
Granger cause changes in CDS spreads, but not the other way around; 
Ordered probit estimation results for the complete sample are reported in Table 1.16. 
Again, the model using the average CDS level as a proxy for credit condition provides the 
more meaningful results and the highest significance level. In line with previous findings, 
estimated coefficients for stock turnover ratio, relative frequency of adverse shocks, average 
CDS spread level, CDS trend, and dummy variable for the year 2002, are found to be 





Table 1.16 Ordered Probit Estimation Results 
 
This table presents ordered probit estimation results, where the dependent variable takes the value of -1 in case 
of clear CDS market leadership, the value of 0 for the situation in which no obvious interpretation can be made, 
and the value of +1 in case of clear stock market leadership. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
In order to ensure the robustness of the results, I perform a probit analysis directly 
confronting two extreme cases. More specifically, I introduce a dummy variable that takes 
only two values: 1 in the case of strict stock market leadership and 0 in case of strict CDS 
market leadership. Results of such probit analysis with a sub-sample of 151 half-yearly 
observations are reported in Table 1.17. Apart from a higher Pseudo-R2 (0.188 for the model 
that includes the average CDS level), results are completely consistent with previous 
findings.  
  
coef z -stat coef z -stat coef z -stat
CDS % bid-ask spread -0.012 ** -2.361 -0.006 -1.194 -0.011 ** -2.261
Stock turnover ratio 0.478 ** 2.234 0.428 ** 1.992 0.470 ** 2.207
Frequency of adverse shocks -0.249 ** -2.224 -0.643 *** -4.354 -0.320 *** -2.729
Credit condition
Credit rating -0.030 -1.034
Average CDS level 0.005 *** 4.339
CDS>100 0.365 ** 2.294
CDS level trend 0.223 * 1.777 0.516 *** 3.472 0.270 ** 2.118
Dummy variables
2002 0.429 *** 2.798 0.334 ** 2.167 0.376 ** 2.460
2004 -0.039 -0.299 0.002 0.013 -0.015 -0.112
Log likelihood -367.399 -358.172 -365.285
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.069 0.051
LR  stat - χ27 34.773 53.227 39.001
Prob(LR  stat)   0.000 0.000 0.000
Explanatory variables Ordered probit estimates 
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Table 1.17 Probit Estimation Results 
 
This table presents probit estimation results, where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 in the case of 
clear stock market leadership and the value of 0 in the case of clear CDS market leadership. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. 
 
1.6  Conclusions 
 
The credit risk of any given company is implicitly or explicitly reflected through 
market prices of different credit sensitive claims, including stocks and credit default swaps. 
Markets where these assets are traded differ in several dimensions – organization, liquidity, 
participants – leading to probable differences in the speed of incorporation of new 
information. In this context, the key question becomes to determine the relative informational 
dominance of respective markets. Although this issue has been the focus of recent studies, the 
analyses conducted in this chapter goes beyond the existing literature by investigating the 
driving forces behind the credit risk discovery process. Specifically, I analyze factors 
underlying the dynamic relationship between stock market implied credit spreads and CDS 
coef z -stat coef z -stat coef z -stat
c 1.657 0.891 -0.059 -0.115 0.345 0.767
CDS % bid-ask spread -0.019 -1.510 -0.011 -1.032 -0.017 -1.549
Stock turnover ratio 1.869 *** 2.794 1.611 ** 2.176 1.706 *** 2.604
Frequency of adverse shocks -0.519 * -1.894 -1.050 ** -2.498 -0.626 ** -2.211
Credit condition
Credit rating -0.047 -0.684
Average CDS level 0.006 ** 2.206
CDS>100 0.346 1.102
CDS level trend 0.622 ** 2.123 0.971 ** 2.219 0.696 ** 2.328
Dummy variables
2002 0.689 ** 2.158 0.646 * 1.894 0.662 ** 2.133
2004 0.040 0.136 0.045 0.154 0.011 0.037
Log likelihood -71.820 -70.724 -73.041
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.188 0.162
LR  stat - χ27 28.877 32.840 28.208
Prob(LR  stat)   0.000 0.000 0.000




spreads in a time-varying context. The analysis is based on a large international sample of 94 
US, European, and Japanese companies, tracked over the 2002-2004 period.  
In this chapter I provide empirical evidence that allows for several conclusions. First, 
credit risk discovery in the stock and CDS markets is a dynamic process. Although the 
obtained results do not contradict the leading role of the stock market documented in previous 
studies, I do find a downward trend in this pattern over the period considered. Second, the 
relative informational dominance of the stock market is significantly influenced by the 
overall credit condition of the reference entity. The probability of the stock market leading 
credit risk discovery increases with the level of credit risk, as does the strength of the 
relationship between the two markets. Yet, consistent with the argument of insider trading in 
the market for credit derivatives, the probability of the CDS market leading credit risk 








Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Structural Credit 
Risk Models with Exogenous Default Barrier 
2.1 Introduction 
Thirty-five years after Merton’s (1974) seminal paper, no consensus yet exists on the 
ability of structural models to reflect the credit risk of companies.21 Under the structural 
setting, debt and equity are treated as contingent claims on the underlying firm’s asset value, 
which, accordingly, becomes the fundamental source of uncertainty driving credit risk. 
Following this argument, structural models should be able to transform the information on a 
firm’s asset value process provided by equity prices into the information on credit risk 
provided, in turn, by credit spreads. This ability of structural models to explain observable 
market levels of credit spreads has been precisely the cornerstone of most empirical tests. 
Until recently, the broadly accepted conclusion was that in this regard structural models have 
not been very successful (Jones et al., 1984; Ogden, 1987; Lyden and Saraniti, 2001; Huang 
and Huang, 2003; Eom et al., 2004). 
The theoretical completeness of structural models has raised a question, however: To 
what extent could this seemingly poor performance actually be a product of the estimation 
methods applied? Key determinants of credit spreads – a firm’s asset value and volatility, 
along with the default barrier – represent pure latent variables; thus, any empirical test 
necessarily represents a simultaneous test of both the structural model at hand and the 
                                                 
21 Merton’s (1974) model was subsequently extended by Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Longstaff and 






estimation method itself. Ericsson and Reneby (2005) and Li and Wong (2008) have shown 
that the empirical performance of structural models is, in fact, largely undermined by 
traditional approaches to the estimation of the firm asset value and volatility (i.e. proxy and 
volatility restriction methods). On the contrary, the maximum likelihood (ML) approach – 
novel in this context and first motivated by Duan (1994, 2000) – provides much greater 
support for theoretically appealing structural credit risk models.22 
In a similar vein, increasing attention is being paid to the exact definition of the 
default barrier. In general, the default triggering firm asset value may either be set 
exogenously (e.g. Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995) or endogenously obtained inside the model 
as the optimal decision for equity holders (e.g. Nielsen et al., 1993; Leland, 1994; Leland and 
Toft, 1996).23 Although this second alternative seems more appealing, it ignores the potential 
influence of other factors on the event of default (e.g. debt covenants, liquidity restrictions, 
insolvency codes). A more recent approach is based on the assumption of an exogenous 
default barrier; but rather than imposing a somewhat arbitrary value (e.g. the debt’s face 
value, KMV’s default point), market data are used to derive this model parameter. Wong and 
Choi (2009) consider this possibility in the case of the down-and-out call valuation model 
discussed by Brockman and Turtle (2003). Specifically, they maximize the likelihood 
function for the time series of equity prices not only as a function of the expected rate of 
return and volatility of the firm assets, but also as a function of the default barrier. Wong and 
Choi’s paper provides an insightful analysis of some of the drawbacks of using the proxy 
approach – as in Brockman and Turtle (2003); however, their results also indicate that 
                                                 
22 Traditional approaches dominate the literature (Jones et al., 1984; Ronn and Verma, 1986; Ogden, 1987; 
Anderson and Sundaresan, 2000; Lyden and Saraniti, 2001; Brockman and Turtle, 2003; Delianedis and Geske, 
2003; Eom et al., 2004). The maximum likelihood approach (Ericsson and Reneby, 2005; Ericsson et al., 2007; 
Li and Wong; 2008, Wong and Choi, 2009) is not the unique option, however. Other approaches include 
simulated maximum likelihood (Bruche, 2004, 2007; Duan and Fulop, 2009) and iterative schemes (Vassalou 
and Xing, 2004; Forte, 2009). 
23 In Merton’s (1974) model, default can occur only at maturity of the debt. Following the ideas of Black and 
Cox (1976), this assumption was subsequently surpassed by allowing a firm to default at any time if the market 
value of its assets falls below some critical lower threshold value – the default barrier. 




standard maximization of the likelihood function can generate misleading results. To be 
precise, at least 25% of their reported barriers are equal to zero, whereas almost 45% are 
above nominal debt and 25% of those values are above two-and-a-half times the face value of 
the debt.24  
Misleading results from likelihood maximization are typically a reflection of an ill-
behaved likelihood function – an old problem in statistics that more commonly appears with 
an increase in the number of unknown parameters – as in the present case. Under these 
circumstances, however, ad hoc procedures can sometimes be defined which, following the 
spirit of likelihood maximization, are naturally referred to as pseudo maximum likelihood 
estimation methods (e.g. Gong and Samaniego, 1981). In this chapter one such method for 
the estimation of structural credit risk models with exogenous default barrier is proposed. 
More explicitly, an iterative algorithm is defined, which, based on the log-likelihood function 
for the time series of equity prices, provides pseudo ML estimates of the default barrier and 
of the value, volatility, and expected rate of return on the firm’s assets. The suggested 
approach is tested empirically using an international sample of 96 companies, whereas the 
reference credit risk model corresponds to the modified version of Leland and Toft’s (1996) 
model suggested by Forte (2009). It is shown that – in line with Wong and Choi (2009) – the 
standard ML approach results in unreal barriers for a substantial proportion of the companies 
considered. On the contrary, the pseudo ML approach suggested in this chapter generates 
reasonable values that fall in the range of 50.3% to 96.9% of the principal value of debt. In 
terms of credit default swap (CDS) spread estimation, theoretical credit spreads based on the 
proposed method provide the lowest pricing errors when compared to other options that are 
                                                 
24 Wong and Choi’s results are not tested in light of their accuracy for credit spread estimation; it is very 
intuitive, however, that credit spreads will be equal to zero for zero default barriers. Furthermore, in the case of 
default boundaries in the order of two-and-a-half times (or more) the face value of the debt, reasonable credit 





usually considered when specifying the default barrier: standard ML estimate, endogenous 
value, KMV’s default point, and principal value of debt.25 
It is worth noting that recent studies suggest using CDS data in addition to equity data 
for the estimation of structural credit risk models. Predescu (2005), for example, derives the 
joint likelihood function for the time series of equity prices and CDS spreads, where the 
equity pricing equation corresponds to the same down-and-out call valuation model analyzed 
by Brockman and Turtle (2003) and Wong and Choi (2009). Additional information on CDS 
premia guarantees a well-behaved likelihood function and, consequently, standard likelihood 
maximization provides default barrier estimates within reasonable bounds in this case.26 
Following a different approach, Forte (2009) employs an iterative scheme to derive the time 
series of firm asset values and the corresponding volatility from the time series of equity 
prices, whereas the default barrier is calibrated from the time series of CDS spreads. Again, 
use of both equity and CDS data ensure reasonable results for most of the cases.  
In this chapter I explicitly refrain from using market data other than equity prices. 
Although the use of CDS spreads for the estimation of structural models undoubtedly 
represents an appealing approach, it does not allow for the most common situation in which 
such information is either unavailable or unreliable. As this is exactly the situation in which 
information regarding credit risk becomes more valuable, this is the one that is presumed in 
this chapter. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
structural model setting. Section 2.3 summarizes the standard ML approach. Section 2.4 
                                                 
25 The use of CDS spreads as a reference is motivated by a second, not minor, problem in previous empirical 
tests: the traditional use of corporate-government yield spreads as a benchmark clashes with the evidence on 
non-credit risk factors in bond premia (Collin-Dufresne, et al., 2001). Accordingly, CDS spreads are 
increasingly seen as a preferred choice, further providing stronger support for structural credit risk models 
(Ericsson et al., 2007; Ericsson et al., 2009; Forte, 2009). 
26 Predescu also analyzes the case in which only equity data are employed for the estimation. She concludes that 
“using only equity prices, the estimation cannot pinpoint the optimal value for the default point for most of the 
firms” (Predescu, 2005; p. 19). 




presents the proposed alternative: the pseudo ML estimation approach. Other methods that 
are usually applied in determining the default barrier are briefly discussed in Section 2.5. 
Section 2.6 offers a full description of the data set. Section 2.7 provides the empirical results, 
in terms of both parameter estimates and predicted spreads. The main conclusions are drawn 
in Section 2.8. 
2.2 The Structural Model Setting  
As a reference credit risk model, I consider the modified version of Leland and Toft’s 
(1996) model suggested by Forte (2009). This model has already been shown to generate 
reasonable predictions on credit spreads as long as the appropriate default barrier is selected; 
therefore, it seems suitable for testing the performance of the pseudo ML estimation approach 
that is proposed in this chapter. Here I merely describe the main features of the model, 
referring the interested reader to the original paper for details.  
The market value of total assets at any time , , is assumed to evolve according to 
the continuous diffusion process: 
, (2.1)
where  is the expected rate of return on the asset value,  is the fraction of the asset value 
paid out to investors,  is the asset return volatility, and  is a standard Brownian motion. 
Default occurs whenever  reaches a specific critical point , defined as a fraction  of the 
nominal value of total debt : 
. (2.2)
The value of an individual bond , with maturity , principal , and constant 





     , 1 1 , (2.3) 
for 1, … , , where  is the risk-free rate,  represents bankruptcy costs, and 
expressions for  and  are given in Appendix A. The total debt value is then 
represented by the sum of all outstanding bonds:  
, . (2.4)
Finally, the equity value is expressed as: 
| 0 , (2.5)
where | 0  is the market value of total debt when bankruptcy costs equal zero. This 
expression follows from the reasoning that the presence of bankruptcy costs affects only 
creditors who, in case of default, receive only a fraction 1  of the firm’s asset value.  
2.3 Standard Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
In order to overcome the problem of unobservability of the asset value process and the 
default barrier parameter , it is possible to apply ML estimation using the transformation of 
variables technique – an idea originally introduced by Duan (1994, 2000). When applied to 
this specific problem, the observable data set of equity values ;  1, … , , can be 
treated as a transformed data set of the unobservable underlying firm asset values ;  1, … , . The ML procedure is then carried out by deriving the log-likelihood 
function for the transformed equity values ; , where the theoretical equity pricing 
formula of the structural model at hand, ; ;  1, … , , serves as a strictly 
monotonic, one-to-one transformation function. Accordingly,  represents the set of 




unknown parameters to be estimated, along with the complete vector of unobservable firm 
asset values .  
Regardless of the specificities of the underlying structural model, a complete closed-
form solution for the log-likelihood function of the observable data set , could be derived 
using standard results on differentiable transformations. Accounting for the survivorship 
issue under the first-passage time framework, and in the simplest case of exogenous and 
constant default barrier, such log-likelihood function can be expressed as (Duan et al., 2003, 
2004):27 
          ; ; , ,                       
; , ln 1 ∆
ln , , ln ; , , 
(2.6)
where  represents the vector of implied firm asset values for a given set , , and for the 
invertible equity pricing equation ; , . 
The first term in expression (2.6) reflects the log-likelihood function for the time 
series of the log-normally distributed firm asset values: 
; , ln 12 2 ∆
12 ∆ ln 2 ∆ . (2.7)
                                                 
27 Maximum likelihood estimation in this context is applicable only in the case where the default barrier is 





The next two terms account for the survivorship issue, with  actually denoting 
the survival probability during the entire sample period: 
, , 12 1 ∆1 ∆
12 1 ∆1 ∆ , 
(2.8) 
where ·  refers to the standard normal distribution function. 
The fourth and final term in expression (2.6) reflects the Jacobian of the 
transformation. Appendix B provides the exact analytical expression for the derivative of the 
transformation, ; , , in the particular case of the model proposed by Forte (2009). 
Following the conventional principle of likelihood maximization, the standard 
approach derives the entire set of unobservable parameters by solving the maximization 
problem:  
, , ; , , .  (2.9)
2.4 Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
In most empirical applications, the exogenous default barrier is predefined, either at 
the face value of the debt, or at a given fraction of this value (e.g. KMV’s default point). In 
such cases, the likelihood function is well-behaved in the parameter space , , and 
numerical maximization is always feasible. The complexity of the problem, however, is 
further augmented when the default barrier itself belongs to the parameter space, , , . In this case, the likelihood function sometimes exhibits a nonstandard behavior 




when applied to real data, and numerical routines may converge to spurious parameter values, 
particularly for the default barrier. 
As an alternative to the standard ML approach described in the previous section, a 
pseudo ML estimation method is suggested in this chapter. Note first that the unrestricted 
maximization problem in the parameter space , ,  described in (2.9) could be actually 
thought of as a restricted maximization problem in the space , , , , specifically, 
          , , ,    , , , . . ; , ; 1, … , , (2.10)
where the restriction ; ,  states that for any possible set of parameter values , , the firm asset value at  is derived by inverting the transformation function. Referring 
specifically to the problem that default barrier estimates could often reach unreasonable 
values under the standard maximization approach, I propose an estimation of the set of 
unknown parameters , , , along with the whole vector of a firm’s asset values , by 
means of the following iterative algorithm: 
Step 1. Propose an initial value for the default-to-debt ratio , and estimate the time series of 
the firm’s asset values , the volatility , and the expected rate of return , by solving the 
restricted maximization problem: 
            , ,   , , | . . ; , ; 1, … , . (2.11)
In this way a set of ML estimates ,  and  is derived conditional on the predefined value 
of , . 
Step 2. Departing from the obtained set of ML estimates in Step 1, solve the unrestricted 
maximization problem: 





This will generate a pseudo ML estimate of  ,  , given the predefined values  ,  and . 
Step 3. If , convergence is attained. If not, set  in Step 1 and repeat until 
convergence is achieved.  
This algorithm provides estimates of parameter values , , and , and of the whole 
vector of the firm’s asset values  that do not necessarily maximize the log-likelihood 
function globally, as in the standard procedure. It does, however, offer several noteworthy 
properties. (a) Estimates of , , and the whole vector of the firm’s asset values  are 
estimates obtained at the global maximum point of the log-likelihood function, conditional 
upon the default barrier level (Step 1). (b) The default barrier is not arbitrarily fixed, but is 
determined conditional on the other parameter values and on the whole set of the firm’s asset 
values (Step 2). (c) The final solution of the algorithm guarantees that the equity pricing 
equation is satisfied for all , providing a consistent overall set of final parameter estimates 
(Steps 1 and 3). (d) Empirical results confirm that this final outcome is, in fact, unique, 
independent of the initial value of , . (e) The proposed procedure offers the major 
advantage of generating much more meaningful default barrier estimates than the standard 
ML approach does. This property is further discussed in Section 2.7. 
2.5 Other Default Barrier Specifications 
For completeness, it seems suitable to include in the analysis other approaches that are 
usually considered in determining the default barrier. In particular, I account for the 
endogenous value, KMV’s default point, and nominal debt value. 
• Endogenous value: Endogenous default models assume the default point to be 
optimally chosen by equity holders. It is specifically derived by invoking the smooth-pasting 
condition (e.g. Leland and Toft, 1996): 




            0. (2.13)
In the case of the model suggested by Forte (2009), the endogenous default-to-debt 
ratio is given by: 
    ∑ ∑ , (2.14)
where exact expressions for  and  are given in Appendix C.28  
• KMV’s default point: In the KMV methodology, the default point is determined as 
short-term liabilities plus 50% of long-term liabilities. In terms of the default-to-debt ratio, 
    0.5 .  (2.15)
• Nominal debt value: Under the simplest assumption, the default barrier is set at the 
face value of the debt: 
1. (2.16)
 It is also worth noting that under these default barrier specifications, estimates of the 
firm’s asset value and volatility must still be defined. In further empirical tests, and for the 
aim of rational comparisons, the ML approach will be used in these cases. More formally, the 
restricted maximization problem 
                , ,    , , | . . ; , ; 1, … , , (2.17)
for , ,  will be solved. 
                                                 






The data set corresponds to the final sample of 96 nonfinancial companies (41 
European, 32 US, and 23 Japanese) analyzed by Alonso et al., (2008). This data set comprises 
the entire period 2002-2004, containing:  
• Daily data on market capitalization (close of business) obtained from DataStream. 
• Daily data on 1- to 10-year locally denominated swap rates, also gathered from 
DataStream.  
• Accounting items referring to short- and long-term liabilities, interest expenses, and cash 
dividends, collected from WorldScope. 
• Daily data on CDS spreads (mid bid-ask quotes) obtained, at the close of business in 
London, New York and Tokyo, from CreditTrade. These data include only 5-year 
contracts denominated in local currency (euro, dollar, or yen). Furthermore, each 
company contains CDS data for at least two consecutive years, with a minimum of 150 
observations per year.29  
Using these data, those model inputs that are treated as known or observable, whether 
the standard or pseudo ML estimation method is employed, are defined. Namely, 
a) Equity value: Daily data on equity value, ;  1, … , , will correspond to daily 
data on market capitalization.  
b) Debt’s principal value : Given that  is treated as a constant, I use the sum of the 
average short-term liabilities  and long-term liabilities . 
c) Debt structure: In line with expression (4), the debt structure needs to be defined – the 
number of individual bonds  and their corresponding characteristics: time to maturity 
                                                 
29 In their final sample, Alonso et al. (2008) include the year 2001 as well. In this study, I exclude that year, 
however, as CDS series satisfying the inclusion criteria were available for only eight companies. 




, coupon , and principal . In order to resemble the true debt structure as much as 
possible, I adopt Forte’s (2009) approach, and assume that at each instant  the company has 
ten bonds – one with a maturity of one year and principal equal to  and nine with 
maturity ranging from two to ten years, each with principal equal to 1/9 of . The coupon 
of each bond is determined as the fraction of average interest expenses  proportional to 
the weight of the principal of each individual bond , over the total principal value of debt 
.  
d) Payout rate: The payout rate  is determined as the average annualized payment of 
interest expense  and cash dividends  to the proxy value of the firm, calculated as 
the sum of market value of equity and book value of total liabilities.  
e) Risk-free interest rate: The risk-free rate for each individual bond is determined 
according to the swap rate for the corresponding maturity. 
f) Recovery rate: Once the estimation of the unknown parameter values and firm asset 
values has been completed, theoretical stock market implied credit spreads (ICS) can be 
derived as the spread from issuing, at par value, a hypothetical bond with the same maturity 
as the CDS spread that serves as a benchmark (five years in this case).30 In principle, this 
requires to define a value for the bankruptcy costs  , which enters in expression (3) through 
the recovery rate, 1 . In terms of CDS spread valuation, however, the market practice 
is to consider a fixed recovery rate of 40%. For the aim of simplicity and more robust 
comparisons, I also adopt this convention. 
Main descriptive statistics for the sample considered are depicted in Table 2.1. The 
average company in the sample has market capitalization of approximately $26.7 billion. 
Equity volatility, defined as the unconditional annualized standard deviation of the 
                                                 





continuously compounded returns on equity, ranges around 36.9%. The mean leverage, 
calculated as the book value of total liabilities over the sum of market capitalization and book 
value of total liabilities, amounts to 52.7%. Yet the leverage of the companies in the sample 
varies, with indebtedness ranging from 3.8% to 92.1%. Regarding CDS spreads, the mean 
level for the entire period considered ranges from 11.33 bp to 306.40 bp on an individual firm 
basis, with the overall cross-sectional mean for all entities being 71.82 bp. The average 
number of daily observations per company is 630, whereas the majority of the companies in 
the sample refer to A and BBB rated issuers. 
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the main descriptive statistics on a cross-sectional basis. The overall sample includes 96 
nonfinancial companies. MC refers to market capitalization in millions of dollars. Equity volatility is defined as 
the unconditional historical volatility calculated as the annualized standard deviation of the continuously 
compounded returns on equity. Leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of total liabilities over the sum 
of market value of equity and book value of total liabilities. CDS spreads refer to the mid bid-ask quote. 
2.7. Results 
2.7.1.  Parameter values 
 Final results on parameter values are shown in Table 2.2, including estimates 
provided by the standard ML approach (MLE), estimates from the pseudo ML approach 
(ALG), and estimates resulting from the assumption of an endogenous default barrier 
Mean 26,705.41 0.37 0.53 71.82 13.29 630 AAA-AA (14)
Median 14,431.07 0.36 0.53 53.37 10.40 712 A (41)
SD 37,858.73 0.09 0.20 62.24 10.31 129 BBB (35)
Min 1,082.89 0.16 0.04 11.33 4.72 418 BB (4)
Max 310,471.20 0.69 0.92 306.40 73.62 759 ND (2)
Rating             
(No. of companies)





No. of daily 
observations 
per company
Equity    
Volatility 
Leverage CDS     
(bp)




(END).31 Main descriptive statistics in Panel A indicate that standard maximization of the 
log-likelihood function leads to default barriers which are, on average, higher than the face 
value of the debt (mean  of 1.093). In addition, the dispersion is significant, with a 
minimum of 0.025 and a maximum of 6.762. These types of results are difficult to reconcile 
with economic intuition. In the first case, the probability of default is almost nil; in the second 
situation, the firm is not able to continue running operations, even when the firm asset value 
is worth as much as 6.7 times the face value of the debt. Moreover, predicted credit spreads 
will be unreasonable in both cases.32  
Table 2.2 Parameter estimates 
This table reports the main descriptive statistics of the parameter estimates (Panel A), along with the distribution 
of default-to-debt ratios (Panel B). Results from the standard ML approach, the pseudo ML approach, and the 
endogenous default barrier approach are considered. 
 
                                                 
31 The convergence criterion for the pseudo ML estimation algorithm is set at 1x10-6 
32 Take, for instance, the upper bound, 6.7. In case of default, and assuming bankruptcy costs of around 30% 
(Leland, 2004), debt holders receive 4.7 times the face value of the debt. Under these circumstances, the credit 
spread will actually be negative. 
βMLE 1.093 0.909 0.823 0.025 6.762
σMLE 0.145 0.132 0.089 0.039 0.542
µMLE 0.021 0.026 0.060 -0.163 0.178
βALG 0.801 0.804 0.085 0.503 0.969
σALG 0.164 0.154 0.091 0.041 0.542
µALG 0.027 0.027 0.067 -0.164 0.239
βEND 0.752 0.762 0.097 0.438 0.945
σEND 0.164 0.154 0.091 0.039 0.541




Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median SD Min Max
[0.0 - 0.1] 4 0 0
(0.1 - 0.2] 3 0 0
(0.2 - 0.3] 1 0 0
(0.3 - 0.4] 0 0 0
(0.4 - 0.5] 0 0 2
(0.5 - 0.6] 3 3 7
(0.6 - 0.7] 3 7 14
(0.7 - 0.8] 15 36 44
(0.8 - 0.9] 19 39 24
(0.9 - 1.0] 16 11 5
(1.0 - 1.1] 3 0 0
(1.1 - 1.2] 6 0 0
> 1.2 23 0 0
Panel B. Distribution of Default-to-Debt Ratios





These puzzling results are an indication of a likelihood function that is not well-
behaved. Figure 2.1, for example, presents the behavior of the log-likelihood function for 
BASF AG. It is apparent that a global maximum is not achieved in this case for any 
reasonable default-to-debt ratio, and standard log-likelihood maximization actually converges 
to a misleading value of 2.085. A whole distribution of default-to-debt ratios in Table 2.2, 
Panel B, suggests that a similar situation is, in fact, repeated for a significant number of 
companies. Notwithstanding, reasonable values are also achieved for many of the cases. 
Take, for instance, the log-likelihood function of Bouygues SA shown in Figure 2.2. Even 
though this log-likelihood function is relatively flat in terms of the default-to-debt ratio, the 
obtained value from the standard approach (0.783) represents a reasonable estimate. In 
summary, it can be concluded that the standard ML approach neither rules out nor guaranties 
reasonable results. 



















Figure 2.2. Behavior of the Log-Likelihood Function for Bouygues SA 
 
On the opposite side, parameter estimates from both the pseudo ML approach and the 
endogenous default barrier approach represent meaningful values for all of the companies. 
More precisely, the default-to-debt ratio  ranges from a minimum of 0.503 to a 
maximum of 0.969, with an average value of 0.801. On the other hand, the minimum, 
maximum, and mean values of   are 0.438, 0.945 and 0.752, respectively. If estimates of 
the firm asset volatility and of the expected rate of return are compared, both methods 
provide virtually identical results; besides, they are typically higher than those provided by 
the standard ML approach. Going back to the instance of BASF AG in Figure 1, it can be 
observed that, in effect, both methods generate more rational results than does the standard 
ML approach. Moreover, analysis of the results for Bouygues SA in Figure 2 reveals an 
interesting feature: pseudo ML estimates in the case of a well-behaved log-likelihood 


















approach. This issue is further explored in Table 2.3, where the main descriptive statistics for 
the difference between pseudo ML and standard ML parameter estimates are provided. 
Although the mean absolute difference between default-to-debt ratios for all companies is 
0.431 (median of 0.099), the mean difference among the group of companies with the most 
reasonable  values (higher than 0.3 and lower than 1) is merely 0.044 (0.016). 
Table 2.3 Differences among parameter values 
 
This table provides the main descriptive statistics for the difference between pseudo ML and standard ML 
parameter estimates.  
Previous results allow for several conclusions. (a) The standard ML approach does 
not represent a good candidate for the preferred method, as it often provides puzzling results. 
(b) In cases in which the log-likelihood is well-behaved and the standard ML approach 
generates rational values, the pseudo ML approach leads to similar results. Notwithstanding, 
the pseudo ML approach provides reasonable values, even when the standard ML approach 
seems to fail. (c) The endogenous default-to-debt ratio could be naturally thought of as a 
lower bound for the true value. In other words, factors that differ from the interest of equity 
holders (e.g. debt covenants, liquidity restrictions, bankruptcy codes) – if present – are 
No. Mean Median SD
|βALG - βMLE| 96 0.431 0.099 0.784
|σALG - σMLE| 96 0.019 0.001 0.040
|µALG - µMLE| 96 0.006 0.000 0.019
|βALG - βMLE| 56 0.044 0.016 0.072
|σALG - σMLE| 56 0.001 0.000 0.002
|µALG - µMLE| 56 0.000 0.000 0.000
All Companies
0.3 < βMLE < 1.0




expected to move the default barrier upwards.33 I find further support for the pseudo ML 
approach in view of this argument, as not only is  higher than  on average, but this 
seems to be the general rule on a firm-by-firm basis: it holds for 94 out of the 96 companies 
in the sample considered. Yet,   values within reasonable bounds are only a minimum 
requirement. Assessment of the real precision – and utility – of the proposed method, requires 
an investigation of its ability to generate sensible credit spread estimates as well; this point is 
addressed in the next sub-section. 
2.7.2 Implied credit spreads 
Results on model implied credit spreads (ICS) on the basis of the different estimation 
methods are provided in Table 2.4, along with the corresponding CDS spreads. It can be 
observed that, in fact, replication of CDS spreads is highly influenced by the chosen 
estimation method. Although the cross-sectional mean level of CDS spreads (71.82 bp) is 
almost fully matched by ICSALG estimates (71.34 bp), this does not hold for other options that 
either underestimate (45.49 bp for ICSEND and 41.07 bp for ICSKMV) or considerably 
overestimate (194.98 bp for ICSMLE and 223.29 bp for ICSP) CDS premia. In addition, 
ICSALG have another desirable characteristic: contrary to other methods – particularly the 
standard ML approach and the KMV approach – ICSALG completely follow the pattern and 
the level of CDS spreads over different rating categories.34  
                                                 
33 A default barrier below the endogenous value would need to be interpreted as the result of equity holders 
being forced to continue running a company, even when they wish to declare the firm bankrupt. Limited liability 
of equity holders rules out this situation, however. 
34 In order to insure that overall conclusions are not affected by the specific choice of the recovery rate, I have 
replicated the analysis by fixing the recovery rate at 51.31%, as in Huang and Huang (2003), and by setting 
bankruptcy costs  equal to 0.3 as in Leland (2004). Results, not presented here, single out once again the best 





Table 2.4 CDS spreads and ICS estimates 
 
This table reports mean values for cross-sectional CDS spreads, along with model implied credit spread (ICS) 
based on the different estimation methods. 
More formal, standard measures of price discrepancy between ICS and CDS series are 
summarized in Table 2.5. In particular, pricing errors are measured by: average basis – avb; 
percentage average basis – avb(%); average absolute basis – avab; percentage average 
absolute basis – avab(%); and root mean squared error – RMSE. Results confirm the initial 
conclusion set forth in Table 2.4; that is, among all possible estimation methods, the pseudo 
ML approach provides the best predictions on CDS spreads. Specifically, the ICSALG – CDS 
basis is, on average, -0.48 bp, suggesting that the ICSALG represent, in practice, an unbiased 
estimator of the CDS spread; furthermore, the mean absolute basis amounts to 43.01 bp. The 
second-best option corresponds to ICSEND, with an average basis of -26.33 bp and an average 
absolute basis of 46.88 bp. The systematic underestimation of credit spreads, as suggested 
also by results in Table 2.4, is, however, consistent with the underestimation of the default 
barrier discussed in previous sub-section. The third-best option seems to be provided by 
KMV’s default point: average basis of -30.75 bp and average absolute basis of 58.66 bp. As a 
counterpart, pricing errors in the light of other methods are sizable, with ICSMLE and ICSP far 
above CDS spreads (average basis of 123.16 and 151.47 bp, respectively). The overall 
conclusion is clear support for the pseudo ML estimation method in comparison with other 
CDS 71.82 22.00 51.39 107.02 151.95
ICSMLE 194.98 176.23 225.16 176.40 91.77
ICSALG 71.34 21.18 48.22 107.53 164.73
ICSEND 45.49 11.85 33.26 63.43 125.76
ICSKMV 41.07 13.18 43.68 50.39 24.25
ICSP 223.29 79.98 175.91 320.70 345.53
All AAA-AA A BBB BB




methods, and particularly in comparison with the standard ML approach. Among all possible 
options, the endogenous default barrier method represents the second-best option.  
Table 2.5 Measures of Pricing Discrepancy 
 
This table provides cross-sectional mean (median) values of the standard measures of credit spread differentials 
between ICS and CDS series: average basis – avb; percentage average basis – avb(%); average absolute basis – 
avab; percentage average absolute basis – avab(%); and root mean squared error – RMSE. 
As a final illustration of the empirical performance of the pseudo ML procedure, I 
assess risk-neutral default probabilities for time horizons ranging from 1 to ten 10 years. 
Risk-neutral default probabilities across the different rating categories, and on a cross-
sectional basis, are presented in Figure 2.3. Following economic intuition, the estimated 
probabilities of default increase with both the time horizon and the average credit riskiness. 
By way of example, the estimated risk-neutral default probabilities for the 5-year horizon are: 
1% for an AAA-AA rated company, 2.8% for A, 5.2% for BBB, and 9.3% for BB. 
ICSMLE 123.16 4.02 158.34 4.44 174.66
(49.95) (1.02) (82.37) (1.18) (92.33)
ICSALG -0.48 0.11 43.01 0.76 52.16
(-8.61) (-0.21) (27.03) (0.57) (32.72)
ICSEND -26.33 -0.23 46.88 0.76 54.94
(-25.07) (-0.55) (32.88) (0.71) (38.04)
ICSKMV -30.75 -0.26 58.66 0.89 66.93
(-29.09) (-0.69) (38.41) (0.86) (42.44)
ICSP 151.47 2.97 156.65 3.03 177.46
(98.24) (2.10) (105.60) (2.10) (124.28)





Figure 2.3. Risk-Neutral Default Probabilities 
 
This figure represents cross-sectional risk-neutral default probabilities by rating category, calculated on the basis 
of the pseudo ML estimates, and for a default time horizon ranging from 1 to 10 years.  
2.7.3 Robustness check 
In order to attain robustness, it seems suitable to verify whether the estimation method 
suggested in this chapter is also capable of providing reasonable results for other structural 
models, and not merely for the one considered in this study. Of particular interest is the 
down-and-out call (DOC) barrier option model discussed by Brockman and Turtle (2003), 
Predescu (2005), and Wong and Choi (2009). Analytical expressions for the DOC pricing 
equation and the first derivative of the element-by-element transformation are given in 
Appendix D.35 
Results from both the standard and pseudo ML estimation method are provided in 
Table 2.6. In line with Wong and Choi (2009), standard likelihood maximization results in 
                                                 
35 Maturity of the DOC option is chosen to correspond to the average maturity of the firm’s total liabilities of 
3.38 years as reported in Stohs and Mauer’s (1996) empirical study. In addition, this is close to the hypothetical 
average maturity of the company’s debt of 3.67 years, calculated by following the assumption made in this 
chapter that the company’s debt at each instant consists of ten bonds: one with a maturity of one year and 
principal equal to , and nine with maturity ranging from two to ten years, each with principal equal to 1/9 of 

































unreal default-to-debt ratios for a substantial number of companies. Namely, this parameter is 
higher than the one for as many as 39 companies (41% of the sample), with a maximum of 
4.410. On the other hand, pseudo ML estimates represent reasonable values that fall in the 
range of 0.156 to 0.891, with a mean value of 0.616. Although estimated values for the 
default-to-debt ratio are lower than those provided in Table 2, this should be interpreted as a 
product of the differences in the underlying structural models. In fact, results in this case are 
consistent with those in Predescu (2005): in the light of the same DOC model, while using 
additional data on CDS spreads, she reports a mean default-to-debt ratio of 0.591. All things 
considered, it can be concluded that the proposed method leads to more meaningful results 
than does the standard ML approach, irrespective of the underlying model. 
Table 2.6 Parameter estimates: BT 
 
This table reports, for the case of the Brockman and Turtle’s (2003) model, main descriptive statistics of the 
parameter estimates (Panel A), along with the distribution of default-to-debt ratios (Panel B). Results from the 
standard ML approach and the pseudo ML approach are considered.  
    
βMLE 1.077 0.934 0.615 0.178 4.410
σMLE 0.151 0.137 0.091 0.042 0.578
µMLE 0.001 0.002 0.059 -0.177 0.161
βALG 0.616 0.627 0.125 0.156 0.891
σALG 0.170 0.160 0.093 0.042 0.578
µALG 0.008 0.002 0.068 -0.177 0.243
Standard ML Estimation
Pseudo ML Estimation
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics

































 In this chapter a new approach for the estimation of structural credit risk models with 
an exogenous default barrier is presented. Specifically, an iterative algorithm that provides 
pseudo ML estimates of the default barrier and estimates of the value, volatility, and expected 
return on the firm’s assets is introduced. This new approach is tested empirically on the basis 
of an international sample of 96 companies. Taking as the reference credit risk model, the 
modified version of Leland and Toft’s (1996) model suggested by Forte (2009), it is 
confirmed that standard maximization of the log-likelihood function often results in unreal 
barriers. On the contrary, the pseudo ML approach proposed in this chapter generates 
reasonable values that fall in the range of 50.3% to 96.9% of the nominal debt value. In terms 
of CDS spread estimation, theoretical credit spreads based on the suggested method generate 
the lowest pricing errors when compared to the other options that are usually considered 
when specifying the default barrier: standard ML estimate, endogenous value, KMV’s default 








Structural Imbalances in the Credit Default Swap Market: 
Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
A widely accepted finding in empirical literature on corporate bonds is that corporate 
bond yield spreads are substantially affected by non-default components such as: taxes, 
illiquidity, and different market microstructure effects (Elton et al., 2001; Longstaff et al., 
2005; Ericsson and Renault, 2006; Chen et al., 2007). In contrast, Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
prices have often been labeled as a “near-ideal” measure of default risk due to their 
theoretical design. CDS represents a type of bilateral insurance contract that provides 
protection against default by the particular reference entity (company or sovereign). As such, 
a premium that the buyer of the protection pays to the seller – the CDS spread, is directly 
linked to the credit quality of the reference entity and is expected to provide a “pure” measure 
of credit risk.  
This argument has been used in several studies and CDS spreads emerged as a 
preferred market benchmark for credit risk when analyzing the bond market or when testing 
the performance of structural credit risk models (Longstaff et al., 2005; Blanco et al., 2005; 
Ericson et al., 2007; Saita, 2006; Han and Zhou, 2008; Nashikkar et al., 2008). Few recent 
studies, however, demonstrate that CDS spreads do in fact contain non-default components. 
Tang and Yan (2007) explicitly consider different facets of liquidity and find that its effect on 
the CDS premium is significant and on par with that of Treasury and corporate bonds. 





effects, and find evidence of liquidity premium earned by the protection seller. Finally, recent 
financial turmoil episodes point out that CDS spreads are not free of non-default components 
and that liquidity should eventually be one of the most important non-default drivers of CDS 
spreads.  
Liquidity is an obscure concept and there is no universally accepted liquidity measure 
or definition. In general, liquidity could be defined as the ability of market participants to 
trade large quantities of asset rapidly without affecting the asset’s price. Although the 
liquidity phenomenon has been studied extensively in the equity and bond markets, much less 
is known about its effects in the CDS market. The CDS market has its distinguishing features, 
however. CDSs are contracts, they are traded in the opaque over-the-counter (OTC) market, 
and the participants in the CDS market are mainly insiders. In the context of the CDS market, 
liquidity has so far usually been proxied and controlled for by the relative bid-ask spread.36 
Still, liquidity has many distinctive aspects, and in order to reveal the driving forces of CDS 
spreads it is necessary to conduct detailed analysis on each of them.   
This chapter treats one particular aspect of liquidity – demand-supply imbalance. 
Fitch Inc. (2004) reports that CDS market at times seems to be subject to structural 
imbalances as protection buyers tend to exceed protection sellers. This intuitively implies that 
in the periods of scarcity of sellers, buyers will be willing to bid higher prices whereas the 
sellers will continue to be concerned about the easiness with which their position could be 
offset after the transaction has been completed and will thus demand a liquidity premium. As 
such, demand-supply imbalance should affect CDS prices and represent one of the important 
aspects of liquidity. The analysis made in this chapter contributes to the existing literature by 
                                                 
36 Tang and Yan (2007) in addition to relative bid-ask spread consider other liquidity measures (volatility-to-
volume, number of outstanding contracts, trades to quotes) some of them taken directly from the literature on 
stock market liquidity. Chen et al., 2005 approximate liquidity by the frequency of price changes. 




providing empirical evidence of the existence of structural demand-supply imbalances in the 
CDS market and by illustrating its effect on the CDS spread dynamics.  
In order to investigate the effect of demand-supply imbalances in the CDS market, it 
is necessary to relate it to the part of the CDS premium not related to fundamentals. 
Theoretically, variables perceived by structural models (market value of the firm’s assets, 
volatility, leverage, and risk-free rate) should be the main determinants of credit spreads. In 
an attempt to explain determinants of CDS spread dynamics, the majority of empirical studies 
follow the approach widely adopted in the corporate bond literature and carries out a linear 
regression on key variables suggested by economic theory (Aunon-Nerin, 2002; Blanco et al. 
2005; Abid and Naifar, 2006; Ericsson et al., 2007; Greatrex, 2009).37 Structural credit risk 
models, however, impose a highly non-linear functional relationship between key variables 
and credit spreads. Following such reasoning, another option lies in the theoretical credit 
spreads that in a single measure, in a non-linear way, jointly account for all key variables.  
In this chapter fundamentals are accounted for through stock market implied credit 
spreads (ICSs). These are estimated using pseudo ML methodology developed in previous 
chapter, using data from stock market only and not relying on any additional information 
from other credit-sensitive markets (CDS or bond market). Obtained ICSs in fact support the 
usefulness of structural models: ICSs can explain substantial part of the cross-sectional 
variation in the CDS spread levels, and theoretical parity relationship between CDS spreads 
and ICSs holds on average as an equilibrium condition. In this way it is possible to isolate the 
component of CDS spreads that is specific solely to the credit market (both on aggregate and 
firm-specific levels), and to relate this component to different imbalance measures.  
                                                 
37 Empirical literature has been so far mainly oriented towards explaining the determinants of corporate bond 
spreads and corporate bond spread changes (Collins-Dufresne et al, 2001; Avramov et al. 2007; Blanco et al. 





In this chapter the economic and statistical significance of different imbalance 
measures on the CDS spread dynamics is empirically demonstrated, pointing out that CDS 
spreads reflect not only a pure credit risk premium, but also a compensation for the 
anticipated costs of unwinding the position of protection sellers. Namely, CDS changes not 
related to fundamentals (CDS innovations) are positively related to an increase in the number 
of bids as regards offers, especially during turbulent times. The evidence is corroborated on 
the representative set of 163 companies (92 European and 71 North American) during a 
relatively long period for CDS market, 2002-2008, including recent financial crisis. 
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
data set. Section 3.3 describes the methodology for extracting the ICSs and assesses the fit of 
the ICSs to market CDS spreads. Section 3.4 introduces different imbalance measures. 
Section 3.5 presents main empirical results over different methodological approaches. Section 
3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Data  
Data on Credit Default Swap spreads is provided by GFI, an inter-dealer broker (IDB) 
in credit derivatives.38 The GFI data comprise information on: intraday quotes and trades, 
reference entity, seniority of the reference issue and maturity.39 There is no trade direction 
indicator, and no information on size. The initial data set contains quotes for 1,688 reference 
entities (54 sovereigns and 1,634 companies), out of which 643 (38.1%) are European and 
                                                 
38 The GFI CDS database has been previously used by Hull et al., (2004), Predescu (2005), Saita (2006), and 
Nashikkar et al., (2008), among others.  
39 The data refer to actual executable and executed market prices where dealers commit capital. As such, the 
data reflect market sentiment rather than indications. The data are previously corrected for errors using both 
experienced data analysts and statistical cleansing algorithms by GFI. 




1,045 (61.9%) are North and South American. The time period spans from January 2002 to 
December 2008.40  
Although the number of reference entities is relatively high for the overall period, the 
number of reference entities with available quote entries in any given year is much smaller 
and amounts to 1,046 (404 European and 642 North and South American) on average. 
Interestingly, the number of reference entities in the European market was increasing steadily 
during the period examined, reaching the maximum of 469 in 2008. The number of reference 
entities in North and South American market was increasing till 2005 and onward declined 
successively, reaching the minimum of 584 at the end of the sample period (see, Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1 No. of reference entities per year and region 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the total number of reference entities in the initial sample (including sovereigns, financial and 
non-financial companies, publically and not publically traded companies) with available quote entries. The data 
are reported per year and per geographical region.  
The initial data set contains 2,265,164 intra-day quote and trade entries expressed in 
basis points. However, there is substantial misbalance between the considered geographical 
                                                 
40 On the initiative of the International Swaps & Derivatives Association (ISDA), the “Big-Bang” protocol with 
new CDS convention - the Standard North American Contract (SNAC), was launched in April 2009. For the 
European region the standardization began from June 2009. These events therefore do not affect the data in the 
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regions. As much as 72.5% (1,641,326) refer to European, whereas just 27.5% (623,838) to 
North and South American reference entities. Moreover, the two geographical regions differ 
substantially in the distribution of quote and trade entries on a yearly basis. That is, the 
number of quotes and trades for the European region was increasing steadily till 2007, 
whereas, the number of quotes and trades for the American region peaked in 2005 (see Figure 
3.2). 
Figure 3.2 No. of quote and trade entries per year and region – initial data set 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the total number of quote and trade entries per year and per geographical region for the initial 
sample.  
In this study I consider only the most liquid, 5 year maturity contracts, (86.3% of the 
available entries), and contracts drowned on senior unsecured debt (90.9% of the available 
entries). For the European market I consider only euro-denominated contracts, and for the 
American market only dollar-denominated CDS contracts. Given that further analysis 
requires data on market capitalization, sovereigns and companies that are not publicly traded 
are excluded from the sample, whereas companies in the banking and finance sector are 
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matched (by company name and industry) with the Datstream database, and several 
companies are further excluded due to the lack of the data.  
Given the purpose of the study and in order to facilitate cross-sectional and time-
series comparison, several additional criteria have been applied. First, with the aim of 
considering as large time period as possible while insuring homogeneity, I include only 
companies that are active in the CDS market from 2002 till the end of 2008. In other words, 
companies that appear in the sample from 2003 or any other subsequent year, and companies 
that have disappeared due to bankruptcy or merger with other companies, are excluded from 
the sample. Second, only companies with relatively active CDS contracts are considered: all 
the companies with 0 trades in any of the considered years, and companies with quotes and 
trades available for less than 5% of the trading days in any of the considered years are 
initially excluded.  
After filtering the initial data set, the final sample comprises 163 companies: 92 
European and 71 North American. The main characteristics of the companies considered are 
presented in Table 3.1. The average European company in the sample has market 
capitalization of 16 billion Euros, leverage of 0.51, and historical equity volatility of 37%. On 
the other hand, the average North American company has market capitalization of 22.4 
billion Dollars, leverage of 0.49, and equity volatility of 0.39%. Leverage is defined as the 
ratio of the book value of total liabilities over the sum of market value of equity and book 
value of total liabilities. Data on market capitalization and book value of liabilities have been 






Table 3.1 Main characteristics of the companies in the sample 
 
This table reports the main descriptive statistics on a cross-sectional basis for the final set of 163 non-financial 
companies (92 European and 71 North American). MC refers to market capitalization in million Euros for the 
European region (Panel A) and million Dollars for the North American region (Panel B). Equity volatility is 
defined as the unconditional historical volatility calculated as the annualized standard deviation of the 
continuously compounded returns on equity. Leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of total liabilities 
over the proxy for the market value of the firm (i.e. sum of market value of equity and book value of total 
liabilities).  
One important characteristic of this final set of companies is that the homogeneity of 
the sample is insured for the entire 2002-2008 period, as all considered companies are present 
with quote entries in every year during the sample period. In total, the final sample contains 
758,787 intra-day quote and trade entries: 622,488 (82%) for the European region and 
136,299 (18%) for the North American region. It is worth noting that despite the applied 
filtering, the final sample turns out to be quite representative: it contains around 1/3 of all 
initially available quote and trade entries during the 2002-2008 period, and it follows the 
pattern of the distribution of initially available quotes and trades over different years and 
regions, as previously discussed (see Figure 3.3).  
Mean 16,027.29 0.37 0.51
Median 9,455.98 0.36 0.51
St. Dev. 15,865.64 0.09 0.20
Min 1,099.81 0.15 0.05
Max 70,441.91 0.71 0.93
Mean 22,445.40 0.39 0.49
Median 12,368.70 0.36 0.50
St. Dev. 34,536.19 0.10 0.17
Min 985.39 0.23 0.13
Max 217,978.56 0.79 0.94
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for European companies
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for North American companies
Statistic   MC in m €  
Equity
Volatility Leverage
Statistic   MC in m $ Equity
Volatility
Leverage




Figure 3.3 No. of quote and trade entries per year and region – final sample 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the total number of quote and trade entries per year and per geographical region for the final 
sample. 
Given that the dataset contains only intra-day bid and ask quotes, daily CDS spread 
observations are constructed on the end-of-day basis in the following manner: if on a given 
day both bid and ask quotes are present, CDS spread refers to the midpoint of the last bid and 
last ask quote; if on a given day only bid (ask) quotes are present, CDS spread refers to the 
midpoint of the last bid (ask) on a given day and the most recently available ask (bid) quote 
entry. In this way, for the selected reference entities there are 124,391 available daily 
observations in total, or, 763 per company on average. This means that for an average 
company in the sample, a new quote is available approximately every second or third trading 
day. Still, there are substantial differences between the companies, with minimum of 12% 
and maximum of 97% of the trading days with quotes availability. The missing data are filled 
in assuming the last observable CDS spread (i.e. the most recent quote) following the 
reasoning that if there is no new bid or ask quote, there is no new information leaked in the 












Finally, it can be argued that it is better to use actual transactions prices instead of 
composed CDS spreads. However, transactions in the CDS market are still relatively scarce. 
This would imply a substantial reduction in the number of considered companies and a 
substantial reduction of the availability of CDS spread observations on a daily basis. By way 
of example, for the final sample the average quoting frequency per day is 399 whereas the 
trading frequency is only 33, i.e. every 12 quotes result in one trade. This is an important 
issue given that the effect of structural imbalances (and other aspects of liquidity) should be 
short-lived and it is therefore necessary to conduct the analysis on higher frequencies, such as 
daily and at most weekly. Most importantly, quotes are binding. Posted bid and ask quotes 
are firm and cannot be withdrawn once they are hit, that is, the issuer is obliged to trade at his 
quote. As such, composed CDS spreads represent a good approximation for the actual CDS 
prices.   
 In order to better capture the time-series variation in CDS spreads, fundamentals and 
imbalance factors, the overall period considered is further divided into three sub-periods: 
from the beginning of 2002 to mid-2003 (Period 1), from mid-2003 to mid-2007 (Period 2), 
and from mid-2007 till the end of 2008 (Period 3), as shown in Table 3.2. The first sub-period 
is characterized by credit market turbulence, high levels of CDS spreads, and the CDS market 
being in its development stage. Starting from the late 2001, the CDS market faced massive 
bankruptcies and other credit events such as the ones of Enron (December 2001), WorldCom 
(July 2002), Xerox (December 2002), and Conseco (August 2002). Global corporate default 
rates peaked in the second half of 2002, and substantially declined since the second half of 
2003 (S&P Report, 2006).41 The second sub-period is characterized by increased contract 
standardization followed by growing CDS market activity measured by the number of quotes 
and trades per day. Moreover, as argued by Imbierowicz (2009), CDS spreads were 
                                                 
41 According to S&P Report (2006) no more than three corporate obligors referenced in synthetic CDOs have 
triggered credit events from the second half of 2003. 




substantially lower from mid-2003, declining up until mid-2007 and the beginning of the 
recent subprime crisis. The third period is the period of the recent financial crisis and is of 
particular interest. In fact, the last sub-period includes significant events for the CDS market 
such as: freeze of the money market (August 2007), the collapse of Bear Stearns (March 
2008) and the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008).42 In this way it is possible to 
conduct analysis and compare empirical findings between normal (Period 2) and stress 
(Period 1 and Period 3) regimes. 
Table 3.2 Sub-periods 
 
Table 3.2 illustrates the division of the overall 2002-2008 sample period into three sub-periods. 
Respecting the abovementioned division into three distinctive sub-periods, Table 3.3 
provides the main characteristics of the final data set. In total, there are data on 700,512 
quotes and 58,275 transactions. Therefore, out of all entries, transactions are represented with 
only 7.7%. Out of available quotes 463,535 (66.2%) are two-sided quotes, 147,226 (21%) are 
net bid quotes, and 89,751 (12.8%) are net ask quotes.43 In general there are more bid quotes 
(protection buyers) than ask quotes (protection sellers), which is already an indication that 
CDS market is likely to be subject to structural imbalances. For the two different 
geographical regions, the distribution of quotes on: two-sided, net bid, and net ask quotes, is 
approximately equal, with bid quotes surpassing ask quotes. However, there is a substantial 
regional difference as to market activity across the three sub-periods, measured by the 
                                                 
42 The interbank credit crunch was initiated on the 9th of August 2007 when the LIBOR-OIS spread jumped 25 
basis points above its 11 bps average. 
43 Two-sided quotes are joint observations of bid and ask quotes at the same point of time.  
Period From To
Period 1 January 2002 June 2003
Period 2 July 2003 June 2007
Period 3 July 2007 December 2008





number of quotes and trades per day. Within the European region the number of quotes and 
trades per day has been rising constantly, reaching the maximum of 656 quotes and 35 
transactions in Period 3. In contrast, within the North American region this measure of 
market activity has substantially declined in the last sub-period: from 227 quotes and 27 
transactions per day in Period 2, to only 25 quotes and 5 transactions in Period 3.   
Table 3.3 Quote and trade entries per period and region – final sample 
 
This table reports the number of quote and trade entries for the overall final sample and for the three distinctive 
sub-periods. Panel A reports the number of quote and trade entries for the 92 European companies, Panel B for 
the 71 North American companies and Panel C for the overall sample of 163 companies. NNBQ refers to the 
number of net bid quotes, NNAQ to the number of net ask quotes, NTSQ to the number of two-sided quotes, 
NQ to the total number of quotes, and NT to the number of transactions.  
total per day total per day total per day total per day total per day
Period 1 9,566 25 8,443 22 21,028 56 39,037 104 5,239 14
Period 2 63,913 64 33,833 34 196,721 197 294,467 294 25,439 25
Period 3 48,480 130 30,215 81 166,528 445 245,223 656 13,083 35
All 121,959 70 72,491 41 384,277 219 578,727 330 43,761 25
total per day total per day total per day total per day total per day
Period 1 8,342 22 6,684 18 13,145 35 28,171 76 2,811 8
Period 2 14,154 38 9,559 26 60,585 163 84,298 227 9,984 27
Period 3 2,771 7 1,017 3 5,528 15 9,316 25 1,719 5
All 25,267 15 17,260 10 79,258 46 121,785 70 14,514 8
total per day total per day total per day total per day total per day
Period 1 17,908 48 15,127 40 34,173 91 67,208 178 8,050 21
Period 2 78,067 78 43,392 43 257,306 257 378,765 378 35,423 35
Period 3 51,251 137 31,232 84 172,056 460 254,539 681 14,802 40
All 147,226 84 89,751 51 463,535 264 700,512 399 58,275 33
Panel C: Quote and trade entries for the overall sample
Period
NNBQ NNAQ NTSQ NQ NT
Panel B: Quote and trade entries for North American companies
Period
NNBQ NNAQ NTSQ NQ NT
Panel A: Quote and trade entries for European companies
Period
NNBQ NNAQ NTSQ NQ NT




3.3 Fundamentals and CDS spreads 
In order to isolate the effect of structural imbalances on CDS spreads, it is necessary 
to control for the fundamental variables driving credit risk. Usually, in the literature, variables 
suggested by structural models of default (market value of the firm’s assets, volatility, 
leverage, and risk-free rate) are considered as fundamental determinants of credit risk. In 
most empirical studies these variables are taken separately in a linear manner to account for 
changes in credit risk (Collins-Dufresne et al, 2001; Aunon-Nerin, 2002; Avramov et al. 
2007; Blanco et al. 2005; Ericsson et al., 2007; Abid and Naifar, 2006; Tang and Yan, 2007; 
Greatrex, 2009). Contrary to this approach, I consider just one variable to account for the 
fundamentals: the theoretical credit spread implied from the stock market (ICS). The 
advantages of this approach are twofold. First, theoretical credit spreads in a single measure 
account for the key variables suggested by the economic theory to be the main determinants 
of credit risk, simultaneously respecting their highly non-linear functional interrelationship. 
Second, theoretical ICSs can be directly confronted and contrasted to CDS spreads as both 
measures represent alternative proxies for the same latent variable – the “pure” credit spread. 
To be precise, the theoretical credit spread is determined on the basis of the modified 
version of the structural model of Leland and Toft (1996) suggested by Forte (2009), as the 
function of the firm’s asset value and other variables necessary to specify the model (risk-free 
rate, volatility, default barrier and recovery rate). Unobservable set of variables (firm’s asset 
value, volatility, and default barrier) are estimated using the pseudo ML approach proposed 
in the previous chapter. This method consists of an iterative algorithm applied to the log-
likelihood function for the time series of equity prices. One main characteristic of the 
proposed procedure is that the estimation relies only on readily available data from the stock 





information from other credit-sensitive markets (bond or CDS market).44 A direct implication 
of this approach is that ICSs are completely independent from the CDS market dynamics. 
The proxy chosen for the risk-free rate in the structural model is the swap rate. The model 
considers 1-10 year swap rates implicitly taking into account the term structure of interest 
rates. The recovery rate is set to 40% in line with the studies of Covitz and Han (2004), 
Altman et al., (2005) and the industry practice.45  
Final results on the volatility and the default barrier parameter estimates are shown in 
Table 3.4. For European companies, the mean cross-sectional estimate of the firm’s asset 
value volatility is 16.86% and the mean default-to-debt ratio is 0.73. For North American 
companies, the mean estimate of the firm’s asset value volatility is 18.44% followed by the 
mean default-to-debt ratio of 0.78. The dispersion of the estimated default-to-debt ratios for 
both set of companies is quite similar, ranging from the minimum of 0.45 and 0.55 to the 
maximum of 0.91 and 0.93 for European and North American companies, respectively. As 
exemplified in the previous chapter, the pseudo ML procedure assures default-to-debt ratios 
for all companies in the sample to fall within reasonable bounds.  
Table 3.4 Parameter estimates 
 
This table reports the main descriptive statistics for the firm’s asset volatility and the default barrier parameter 
estimates for a cross-section of European (Panel A) and North American (Panel B) companies.  
                                                 
44 The subset of balance sheet and income statement items used in the estimation include: short and long-term 
liabilities, interest expenses and cash dividends. Data on these items is downloaded from Datastream. 
45 The analysis is verified for different specifications of the recovery rate.  
Mean 0.17 0.73 Mean 0.18 0.78
Median 0.16 0.74 Median 0.17 0.78
SD 0.07 0.08 SD 0.07 0.07
Min 0.02 0.45 Min 0.04 0.55
Max 0.42 0.91 Max 0.42 0.93
















Summary statistics for CDS spreads and ICSs on a cross-sectional basis are provided 
in Table 3.5. For the entire sample, the average CDS spread for European companies was 
103.31 bp and for North American companies 123.89 bp. On average, ICSs underestimate 
observable CDS spreads. The mean ICS for European companies was 93.01 bp and for North 
American companies 88.28 bp. There is also a significant time-series variation in CDS 
spreads, as well as in ICS discrepancy. As expected, the discrepancy is higher during stress 
periods (Period 1 and Period 3) being particularly high during the last subprime crisis period, 
and much lower during the normal period (Period 2).  
Table 3.5 Summary Statistics for CDS spreads and ICS estimates 
 
This table reports main cross-sectional descriptive statistics for CDS spreads and model implied credit spreads 
(ICS) for the overall sample and across three sub-periods considered. Panel A and Panel B report CDS spreads 
and ICSs for European and North American companies, respectively. 
More formal measures of pricing discrepancy: the average basis - avb, the average 
percentage basis - avb(%), the average absolute basis - avab, the average absolute percentage 
basis – avb(%), and the Root Mean Squared Error - RMSE, are presented in Table 3.6. For the 
overall period ICSs on average underestimate market CDS spreads by 10.3 bp within the 
mean median sd mean median sd
Period 1 158.65 92.40 166.72 140.06 87.95 133.21
Period 2 70.80 43.25 85.09 75.51 46.92 101.35
Period 3 137.36 93.99 121.94 93.92 38.36 161.34
All 103.31 69.46 93.81 93.01 57.37 102.37
mean median sd mean median sd
Period 1 175.22 106.54 155.48 116.90 81.98 106.11
Period 2 93.95 47.07 112.93 73.20 35.37 94.47
Period 3 158.00 100.42 161.31 102.56 31.25 171.32
All 123.89 70.59 120.91 88.28 49.04 100.52
Panel B: CDS spreads and ICS for North American companies
Period CDS ICS






European region. It is worth noting that the overall fit for European companies is much better 
on average than for North American companies. Within the North American region ICSs 
underestimate observed CDS spreads by 35.61 bp on average. Finally, as expected, pricing 
errors are larger in times of credit market turbulence and high levels of credit spreads, being 
the fit the best for Period 2 and the worst for Period 3.  
Table 3.6 Measures of CDS spreads and ICS pricing discrepancy 
 
This table provides mean and median values of the standard measures of credit spread differentials between ICS 
and CDS spread series: the average basis - avb, the average percentage basis – avb(%), the average absolute 
basis - avab, the average absolute percentage basis – avb(%), and the Root Mean Squared Error - RMSE. 
Measures of pricing discrepancy are reported for the overall sample and for three sub-periods considered. Panel 
A and Panel B report CDS spreads and ICS pricing differentials for European and North American companies, 
respectively. 
In addition to firm-specific credit spreads, there is a possibility to consider CDS and 
ICS market indices. For that purpose I have constructed a CDS market index ( ) and its 
direct counterpart – an ICS market index ( ), as an equally weighted portfolio of all 
companies in the European or North American sub-samples (i.e. market wide portfolio). In 
this way, constructed historical synthetic time-series of regional  and  indices 
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
Period 1 -18.59 -9.25 0.02 -0.09 77.22 51.92 0.59 0.51 92.31 62.37
Period 2 4.72 2.11 0.12 0.02 38.44 23.83 0.67 0.61 45.77 29.09
Period 3 -43.43 -49.79 -0.48 -0.65 79.25 56.99 0.67 0.70 99.14 68.08
All -10.30 -10.42 -0.03 -0.05 55.09 39.32 0.65 0.63 77.40 56.37
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
Period 1 -58.32 -42.23 -0.27 -0.40 83.32 61.02 0.52 0.50 95.91 72.18
Period 2 -20.74 -13.92 -0.23 -0.36 44.96 28.75 0.59 0.55 53.96 32.57
Period 3 -55.44 -49.82 -0.49 -0.65 97.71 65.33 0.72 0.73 116.71 78.39
All -35.61 -23.32 -0.29 -0.40 63.68 44.59 0.60 0.59 85.39 61.40
Panel A: CDS spreads and ICS pricing discrepancy for European companies
Period avb avb (%) avab avab (%)
avab (%) RMSE
RMSE
Panel B: CDS spreads and ICS pricing discrepancy for North American companies
Period avb avb (%) avab




have an important desirable property: they are homogeneous across time. Although there is 
also a possibility to refer to iTraxx index, and CDX index here, I refrain from such approach 
for several reasons. First, iTraxx and Dow Jones CDX Indexes are available on regularly 
basis from mid-2004, what would imply a considerable reduction in the sample period that 
could be considered. Second, constituencies of the indexes have been changing over time, 
resulting in the loss of homogeneity. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 illustrate constructed  
and  global market indices for the European and North American regions, respectively. 
The overall sample is further divided based on the average rating of the obligor during the 
time period considered into investment and non-investment grade sub-samples, and 
corresponding investment grade and high-yield indices are constructed for the two distinctive 
geographical regions (see Figure 3.6 to Figure 3.7).   
Figure 3.4  and  indices – overall European sample 
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates CDS market ( ) and ICS market ( ) indices for the European region. Indices are 



















Figure 3.5  and  indices – overall North American sample 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates CDS market ( ) and ICS market ( ) indices for the North American region. 
Indices are constructed as an equally weighted portfolio of all the companies in the sample.                                                                
Figure 3.6  and  for investment-grade European companies 
 
Figure 3.6 illustrates CDS market ( ) and ICS market ( ) investment grade indices for the European 
region. Indices are constructed as an equally weighted portfolio of those companies whose average rating during 
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Figure 3.7  and  for non investment-grade European companies 
 
Figure 3.7 illustrates CDS market ( ) and ICS market ( ) high-yield indices for the European region. 
Indices are constructed as an equally weighted portfolio of those companies whose average rating during the 
time period considered falls within the speculative grade category.   
Figure 3.8  and  for investment-grade North American companies 
 
Figure 3.8 illustrates CDS market ( ) and ICS market ( ) investment grade indices for the North 
American region. Indices are constructed as an equally weighted portfolio of those companies whose average 





























Figure 3.9 CDSm and ICSm for non investment-grade North American companies 
 
Figure 3.9 illustrates CDS market ( ) and ICS market ( ) high-yield indices for the North American 
region. Indices are constructed as an equally weighted portfolio of those companies whose average rating during 
the time period considered falls within the speculative grade category.   
It is also possible to compare the levels of CDS spreads and ICSs between companies. 
Using daily CDS data, I run daily cross-sectional regressions of CDS spreads on its 
theoretical counterparts – ICSs:  
           . (3.1) 
Daily cross-sectional regressions are conducted for the total of approximately 1,740 
time points and separately for the European and North American regions. Results on the 
explanatory power, measured by the adjusted R2 statistics, are presented in Table 3.7. For 
European companies, theoretical credit spreads are able to explain, on average, around 62.6% 
of the cross-sectional variations of the CDS spread levels. The standard deviation of the 
explanatory power is relatively low and amounts to 11.2%. Similar results are obtained for 
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between firm-specific CDS spread levels slightly better with an average daily adjusted R2 of 
65.9% and a standard deviation of 9%. This means that the structural model, based on firm-
specific fundamentals, is able to differentiate reasonably well between firm-specific CDS 
spread levels on a daily basis. Across considered sub-periods the average adjusted R2 seems 
to be quite balanced. However, during the last sub-period, the explanatory power of ICSs was 
slightly higher than the average for the European companies and slightly lower than the 
average for the North American companies.  
Table 3.7 Explanatory power of ICS – daily cross-section 
 
This table provides main descriptive statistics for the explanatory power (measured by adjusted R2) of daily 
cross-sectional regressions of CDS spreads on its theoretical counterparts - ICSs. Panel A and Panel B refer to 
European and North American regions, respectively. 
Mean 0.596 0.623 0.666 0.626
Median 0.622 0.633 0.676 0.650
Max 0.817 0.805 0.804 0.817
Min 0.256 0.361 0.262 0.256
SD 0.134 0.105 0.094 0.112
Mean 0.673 0.683 0.584 0.659
Median 0.683 0.687 0.581 0.667
Max 0.840 0.846 0.873 0.873
Min 0.440 0.500 0.394 0.394
SD 0.099 0.072 0.087 0.090
Panel B:  North American companies
Statistics Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All
Panel A:  European companies





3.4. Imbalance Measures 
In the literature no consensus yet exists on what precisely liquidity is and how it can 
be measured. In general, liquidity could be defined as the ability of market participants to 
trade large quantities of asset rapidly without affecting the asset’s price. In fact, liquidity is 
characterized with multiple facets and cannot be explained with sufficient statistics (Tang and 
Yan, 2007). To date, liquidity has been studied extensively in the equity and bond markets, 
however, there is still not much evidence of the effect it has on the CDS market, traditionally 
believed to be less influenced by non-default components. Pioneering in this context, the 
studies of Tang and Yan (2007) and Bongaerts et al. (2010) provide evidence of the presence 
of liquidity effects in the CDS market. Tang and Yan (2007) consider different facets of 
liquidity (relative bid-ask spread, volatility-to-volume, number of outstanding contracts, 
trades to quotes) but carry out analysis using monthly frequency. Bongaerts et al. (2010) 
propose a theoretical asset pricing model that allows for liquidity effects, and find evidence 
of liquidity premium earned by the protection seller.  
The analysis of liquidity issues in the CDS market is not straightforward. This market 
is opaque, over-the-counter market, and no trading party has full knowledge of the positions 
of others (Acharya and Bisin, 2010). Moreover, as opposed to stocks and bonds, CDS are 
bilateral contracts, and for CDS market to function at least some investors must have positive 
demand for credit protection, and at least some investors must be willing to sell credit 
protection. However, buyers and sellers do not tend to emerge at the same pace in the CDS 
market and, as reported by Fitch (2004), protection buyers often exceed protection sellers. 
Moreover, sellers of credit protection remain exposed to credit risk and will continue to be 
interested in the liquidity of the market after the transaction has been completed. In case of 
deficiency of sellers, it is likely that the seller will positively affect the mid-market quote by 




demanding a liquidity premium as a compensation for the lack of immediacy he would face 
for offsetting the position. In fact, in the CDS market characterized by more buyers than 
sellers, buyers are those that demand liquidity whereas sellers are those that provide liquidity. 
As a result, frequent demand-supply imbalances are likely to negatively affect the liquidity in 
the CDS market and to distort CDS prices. In order to illustrate the effect on CDS prices and 
to ensure the robustness of the findings, I consider various proxies for demand-supply 
imbalance (pressure).  
 imbalance measure is defined as the difference of the relative proportion of bid 
and ask quotes in the total number of quotes: 
 
Given that the data set consists of one-way and two-way quotes, both are considered for 
calculating the  measure. The aim of this imbalance measure is to point to the direction 
of the imbalance, not only to the general imbalance between bid quotes and ask quotes. 
Acharya et al. (2008) use this measure of imbalance for the bond market but in terms of 
volume. Given that contracts in the CDS market are quite standardized in terms of nominal 
value of the reference obligation, this measure should represent a reasonable approximation.  
 imbalance measure is defined as the ratio between the number of net ask 
quotes ( ) and the total number of quotes ( ): 
 
Acharya et al., (2008) construct  measure for the bond market as the ratio of the net 
quantity of the offer quote providers on a particular day to the total number of quote 
providers. As GFI dataset comprises no information on the actual number of quote providers, 





 imbalance measure is constructed to complement the  measure and 
to proxy for demand pressure. The  measure is defined as the ratio of the number of 
net bid quotes ( ) to the total number of quotes ( ): 
 
  imbalance measure is defined as the ratio between the number of bid quotes 
( ) and the number of ask quotes ( ):  
 
The  proxy for demand-supply imbalance, like the  measure, is designed to 
indicate whether the imbalance comes from demand or supply side. Meng and Gwilym 
(2008), as one of the explanatory variables of bid-ask spread, consider the absolute value of 
one minus the ratio of the number of offers ( ) to the number of bids ( ) on a given 
trading day. Such measure proxies for the general demand-supply imbalance, but doesn’t 
reveal its direction, which is the effect analysed in this study. In fact, the demand-supply 
pressure is not necessarily reflected through the bid-ask spread. 
As a control variable for all of the introduced measures, I consider the number of 
trades to the number of quotes ( 2 ):  
2  
Actually, 2  could be considered as liquidity measure that proxies for matching intensity in 
the CDS market (Tang and Yan, 2007), where a higher matching intensity implies a more 
speedy trade.  




As an additional control variable for  and  imbalance measures I introduce 
the percentage of two-sided quotes ( ) measure calculated as the ratio between the 
number of two-sided quotes ( ) and the total number of quotes ( ):  
 
The  reveals the actual quote balance in the market, and is directly negatively correlated 
with  and  measures; Therefore, due to the multicolinearity problem these 
measures cannot be considered jointly. 
As regards the effect on the CDS spreads, , , and  imbalance 
measures are expected to have a positive impact. Namely, at times when sellers are scarce 
buyers are likely to be willing to bid higher prices, and sellers are likely to ask for a liquidity 
premium for taking on credit risk in the situation when it becomes more difficult to unwind 
the taken position. The  measure, in contrast, is expected to have negative impact on 
CDS spreads. Namely, at good times when investors are readily willing to sell credit 
protection, sellers are likely to be willing to ask lower prices. The impact on matching 
intensity, as argued by Tang and Yan (2007) can have different implications on pricing, given 
that an increasing matching intensity might come either from demand shock or from supply 
shock. Finally, the  measure is expected to be negatively related with CDS spreads as 
higher balance of bids and offers implies lower pressure on prices. 
Although there is a possibility to refer here to the total number of quotes or number of 
trades on a given day ( ), I refrain from this approach for the following reason: higher 
level of , as a measure of total market activity, could imply higher demand for credit 
protection, but could also be an indication of the CDS market steady development and 





sense, for the effect that I want to consider, relative measures seem more appropriate as they 
have more meaningful and direct interpretation.  
Table 3.8 reports the summary of considered imbalance measures and control 
variables calculated as cross-sectional averages across the European and North American 
regions for the overall sample period, and for the three distinctive sub-periods. Firm-specific 
imbalance measures are considered only if both – bid and ask quotes – are available on the 
same day. Preliminary evidence suggests that the number of bids overpasses the number of 
offers in all sub-periods and for both regions. During periods of market turbulence, 
percentage of two-sided quotes is, however, reduced and absolute imbalance is increased, 
especially within the North American region. It also seems that the measures are of the 
similar magnitude in both geographical regions. 
Table 3.8 Imbalance measures 
 
This table reports different imbalance measures and control variables calculated as cross-sectional averages for 
the overall sample period, and for three distinctive sub-periods across the European region (Panel A) and the 
North American region (Panel B).  
  
Period 1 0.020 0.209 0.229 1.101 0.079 0.562
Period 2 0.117 0.108 0.225 1.218 0.074 0.666
Period 3 0.107 0.125 0.231 1.256 0.035 0.644
All 0.094 0.134 0.227 1.201 0.067 0.639
Period 1 0.038 0.304 0.342 1.073 0.068 0.355
Period 2 0.055 0.149 0.204 1.076 0.073 0.647
Period 3 0.130 0.193 0.323 1.170 0.091 0.485
All 0.063 0.191 0.254 1.093 0.074 0.555
Panel A: Imbalance measures for European companies
Period BAQ Offerer Bidder NBA TSQPT2Q
Panel B: Imbalance measures for North American companies
Period BAQ Offerer Bidder NBA TSQPT2Q




3.5 Empirical Results 
The empirical methodology applied in this chapter is based on extracting the part of 
the CDS spreads not explained by fundamentals, and relating the non-default component to 
different imbalance measures. Given that the primary interest of the chapter is on the time 
variations of the non-default component, there are two additional issues that need to be 
discussed further: should analysis be conducted on levels or changes, and the time frequency 
at which the demand-supply imbalance effect is going to be analysed. CDS spreads have unit 
roots. Running the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) for the presence of unit roots shows 
that firm-specific CDS spreads for 148 out of 163 companies (90.8%) are non-stationary (see 
Table 3.9). Within the European region, unit roots are detected for 85 out of 92 companies 
(92.4%) at the 95% confidence level. Likewise, within the North American region, CDS 
spreads for the majority of the companies are non-stationary - 63 out of 71 (88.7%). Almost 
the same findings are obtained for firm-specific ICS time-series. On the contrary, the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity for the first-differences of CDS spread (and ICS) series is 
rejected for all companies in the sample.46 Given that CDS spreads are mostly I(1) processes, 
running a time-series regression directly on CDS spread levels would give a high R2, but 
these regressions are potentially spurious. One of the immediate responses to the non-
stationarity of CDS spread series is to consider changes in CDS spreads instead of levels, 
which is the approach adopted in this chapter and discussed further.  
Another important issue refers to the chosen time frequency. By way of example, if 
changes in  are regressed on contemporaneous changes in  the R2 sharply rises 
from 17% for daily frequency, to 29% for weekly and 51% for monthly frequency for the 
European region, and from 11%, to 29% and 47% for the North American region. Although 
                                                 
46 The unit root analysis is also conducted for  and  indexes. Analogous to firm-specific CDS and 





lowering the time frequency at which the data are analyzed has the effect of raising the R2 
statistics, analysis of short-lived liquidity effects asks for higher time frequencies. The 
majority of the studies on CDS spread determinants use lower time frequencies. For example, 
Tan and Yang (2007) and Greatrex (2009) use monthly data. This choice of the time 
frequency is brought by insufficient number of observations on daily basis at the firm-
specific level, and possible increased noise in the daily data. For the specific sample of CDSs 
used in this chapter, bid and ask quotes – and consequently imbalance measures – are 
available on average every 2.5 days on a firm-specific level.47 One possibility to overpass 
these issues is to construct market indices (global market index, and/or rating based indices) 
as averaging on a cross-sectional basis also has the effect of minimizing the noise in the data 
while allowing for observations on a daily basis. The other possibility is to use weekly data as 
in Blanco et al. (2005), and Ericsson et al. (2009). For the aim of robustness both approaches 
are adopted in this chapter and will be discussed further. 
Table 3.9 Augmented Dickey – Fuller Test (summary results) 
 
This table provides summary results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test for the presence of unit roots 
in the level of CDS and ICS series, and their first-differences. The table reports the number of companies in the 
sample for which the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (unit roots) and the number of 
companies for which the null hypothesis is rejected. Confidence level of 95% is used as criteria for rejecting the 
null hypothesis.  
 
                                                 
47 Firm-specific imbalance measures are calculated only in the case when both - bid and ask quotes - are present 
on a given trading day. 
Levels
No. Non-Stationary 85 (92.4%) 63 (88.7%) 148 (90.8%) 81 (88.0%) 61 (85.9%) 142 (87.1%)
No. Stationary 7 (7.6%) 8 (11.3%) 15 (9.2%) 11 (12.0%) 10 (14.1%) 21 (12.9%)
First differences
No. Non-Stationary 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
No. Stationary 92 (100.0%) 71 (100.0%) 163 (100.0%) 92 (100.0%) 71 (100.0%) 163 (100.0%)
Series CDSs ICSEurope North America All Europe North America All




3.5.1 CDS innovations 
In the vein of the study of Acharya and Johnson (2007), the first step consists of 
isolating the component of CDS spread changes that is specific solely to credit market, and 
that is not attributable to changes in fundamentals, that is, CDS innovations. Specifically, 
CDS innovations are obtained as the residuals from regressing changes in CDS spreads on 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in fundamentals (ICS), and on lagged changes in CDS 
spreads as described in the equation (3.2).48 As such, the residuals of the specified regression 
could be seen as stock market independent CDS shocks. Lag length is imposed to equal to 5 
days, assuming that this is a reasonable time to allow for all information processing and 
transmission while controlling for the issues of autocorrelation.  
          ∆ ∆ ∆ . (3.2) 
Results from the specified regression, conducted using  and  market 
indexes for the two different regions, and considering three distinctive sub-periods, as well as 
the overall sample, are presented in Table 3.10. As to the overall period, the adjusted R2 for 
the European and North American region amounts to 35.5% and 37.8%, respectively. The 
adjusted R2 is substantially higher during periods of credit market turbulence and lower 
during a quiet period, for both geographical regions. This is in line with common finding in 
the literature that structural models perform better in explaining the dynamics of CDS spreads 
during stress times. Moreover, most of the explanatory power can be attributed to 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in ICSs. This is demonstrated by estimating reduced 
models in which either: (a) lagged changes in CDS spreads or, (b) contemporaneous and 
lagged changes in ICSs, are omitted (see Table 3.11). 
                                                 
48 In the original study Acharya and Johnson (2007) extract CDS innovations on the basis of non-linearly related 
equity returns, used as a reflection of fundamentals. Instead, I use theoretical credit spreads - ICS. 
 
 
Table 3.10 Regression results 
 
Table 3.10 presents the results from regressing changes in CDS spreads on contemporaneous and lagged changes in fundamentals (ICS), and lagged changes in CDS spreads. 
Regressions are conducted using constructed  and  market indexes for the two different regions, and considering three distinctive sub-periods as well as the 
overall sample. Lag length is imposed to equal 5 days. Standard errors are calculated as Newey-West HAC Standard Errors. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
∆ICSt βt 0.21 *** 0.18 *** 0.54 *** 0.36 *** ∆ICSt βt 0.16 *** 0.23 *** 0.13 *** 0.17 ***
∆ICSt‐1 βt‐1 0.14 *** 0.10 *** 0.05 0.10 *** ∆ICSt‐1 βt‐1 0.20 *** 0.22 *** 0.22 *** 0.21 ***
∆ICSt‐2 βt‐2 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 ∆ICSt‐2 βt‐2 0.03 0.06 0.14 ** 0.05 ***
∆ICSt‐3 βt‐3 0.05 -0.01 0.13 * 0.07 ** ∆ICSt‐3 βt‐3 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 *
∆ICSt‐4 βt‐4 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 ∆ICSt‐4 βt‐4 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.03
∆ICSt‐5 βt‐5 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.05 * ∆ICSt‐5 βt‐5 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.02
∆CDSt‐1 γt‐1 0.27 *** 0.25 *** 0.36 *** 0.33 *** ∆CDSt‐1 γt‐1 0.16 *** 0.12 * 0.02 0.12 ***
∆CDSt‐2 γt‐2 0.03 0.10 ** 0.01 0.03 ∆CDSt‐2 γt‐2 0.14 ** 0.01 0.15 ** 0.10 ***
∆CDSt‐3 γt‐3 0.11 ** 0.03 0.00 0.03 ∆CDSt‐3 γt‐3 0.11 ** 0.09 0.25 *** 0.14 ***
∆CDSt‐4 γt‐4 0.01 0.05 -0.13 -0.09 ∆CDSt‐4 γt‐4 0.10 * 0.02 0.06 0.06 **
∆CDSt‐5 γt‐5 -0.01 0.06 * 0.12 ** 0.11 *** ∆CDSt‐5 γt‐5 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.03
adj  R2 0.34 0.21 0.41 0.36 adj  R2 0.39 0.17 0.50 0.38
N0 of observations 369 1001 369 1739 N0 of observations 362 1001 351 1714
Panel B: Regressions - North America
Variable  Coefficient Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All
Panel A: Regressions - Europe
Variable  Coefficient Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All




Table 3.11 Regression results 
 
Table 3.11 presents results from: (a) regressing changes in CDS spreads on contemporaneous and lagged 
changes in fundamentals (ICS) and, (b) regressing changes in CDS spreads on lagged changes in CDS spreads. 
Regressions are conducted using constructed  and  market indexes for the two different regions, and 
considering three distinctive sub-periods as well as the overall sample. Lag length is imposed to equal to 5 days. 
Standard errors are calculated as Newey-West HAC Standard Errors. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, 
** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
∆ICSt βt 0.20 *** 0.19 *** 0.54 *** 0.35 ***
∆ICSt‐1 βt‐1 0.19 *** 0.15 *** 0.24 *** 0.21 ***
∆ICSt‐2 βt‐2 0.08 * 0.07 *** 0.08 0.07 **
∆ICSt‐3 βt‐3 0.10 *** 0.05 ** 0.16 *** 0.11 ***
∆ICSt‐4 βt‐4 0.06 * 0.02 -0.07 0.01
∆ICSt‐5 βt‐5 0.08 ** 0.05 ** 0.12 ** 0.08 ***
∆CDSt‐1 γt‐1 0.38 *** 0.29 *** 0.41 *** 0.40 ***
∆CDSt‐2 γt‐2 0.02 0.11 *** 0.00 0.01
∆CDSt‐3 γt‐3 0.12 ** 0.04 0.02 0.04
∆CDSt‐4 γt‐4 0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.07
∆CDSt‐5 γt‐5 -0.04 0.05 0.17 ** 0.11 **
adj  R2 0.27 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.32 0.16 0.26 0.17
N0 of observations 369 369 1001 1001 369 369 1739 1739
∆ICSt βt 0.16 *** 0.23 *** 0.14 ** 0.17 ***
∆ICSt‐1 βt‐1 0.22 *** 0.25 *** 0.26 *** 0.23 ***
∆ICSt‐2 βt‐2 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.17 *** 0.10 ***
∆ICSt‐3 βt‐3 0.11 *** 0.07 *** 0.09 0.10 ***
∆ICSt‐4 βt‐4 0.09 *** 0.06 ** 0.20 *** 0.10 ***
∆ICSt‐5 βt‐5 0.04 0.07 * 0.15 ** 0.06 ***
∆CDSt‐1 γt‐1 0.32 *** 0.21 *** 0.10 0.23 ***
∆CDSt‐2 γt‐2 0.17 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.14 ***
∆CDSt‐3 γt‐3 0.08 0.11 0.30 *** 0.15 ***
∆CDSt‐4 γt‐4 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.03
∆CDSt‐5 γt‐5 -0.04 -0.03 -0.15 * -0.05 *
adj  R2 0.32 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.37 0.27 0.28 0.14
N0 of observations 362 362 1001 1001 351 351 1714 1714
Panel B: Regressions - North America
Variable Coefficient Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All
Panel A: Regressions - Europe





In the second step, extracted daily CDS innovations are related to considered 
imbalance measures ( ) within the univariate regression framework described in (3.3a), 
and within the multivariate regression framework described in (3.3b) that in addition to 
imbalance measures considers 2  and  control variables.49 Imbalance and control 
measures at market level are calculated as cross-sectional averages at each time point as 
previously reported in Table 3.8. 
            , . (3.3a)
          , 2 . (3.3b)
The results, reported in Table 3.12, show that even regressions with daily CDS 
innovations reveal significance of considered imbalance aspects. As expected, demand 
pressure has positive effect on CDS innovations. Namely, , , and  measures 
are positively related to CDS innovations, whereas  measure is negatively related.50 
Interestingly, the 2  ratio, when significant, is found to have a positive sign, although we 
would naturally expect a negative sign in all of the cases. One possible explanation could be 
the result of Acharya and Johnson (2007) who find evidence of informed trading in the most 
actively traded contracts; and the result of Tang and Yan (2007) who find a positive relation 
between matching intensity and CDS spreads for contracts with larger probability of 
informed trading, suggesting that the risk of adverse selection is priced in the CDS market. At 
last, , when significant, has negative sign as expected, suggesting that a higher 
                                                 
49 The analysis is robust to employing lagged imbalance measures.  
50 The analysis is also conducted for absolute demand/supply imbalance as described in Meng and Gwilym 
(2008). The sign of this imbalance measure is not stable suggesting that what matters for CDS pricing is whether 
the imbalance comes from demand or supply side, not the general imbalance. Given that in the CDS market 
demand for credit protection more frequently surpasses the supply, in general the impact of the absolute 
imbalance is found to be positive. 




proportion of balanced quotes results in lower CDS innovations.51 For the overall sample 
period the demand-supply imbalance has little explanatory power (1% - 3%) across both 
geographical regions. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in 
,  and  is equivalent, on average, to a 14% standard deviation increase in the 
CDS innovations for both geographical regions. However, European and North American 
regions differ substantially across considered sub-periods.52 
For the European region the explanatory power of the imbalance measures during the 
first stress period ranges up to 2%, and during the second, quiet period, up to 4%. However, 
during the recent financial turmoil (Period 3) ,  and  measures are able to 
explain as much as 12%, 14%, and 12%, respectively, of the variations in daily CDS 
innovations. Although these measures are also significant and with the expected positive sign 
during the non-crisis period, the absolute value of the coefficients substantially rises in the 
period of the subprime crisis, suggesting a drastic increase in the economic significance of 
demand-supply imbalances. Specifically, the magnitude of the coefficients for Period 2 rises: 
for the  measure from 1.02 to 21.29; for the  measure from 1.38 to 32.09; and for 
the  measure from 0.74 to 9.47. The  measure in Period 3 also has a high 
magnitude (-20.91), is statistically significant at the 1% level, and explains around 9% of the 
variations in daily CDS innovations. In terms of economic significance, this means that one 
standard deviation increase in the demand pressure ( ,  and  on average) is 
equivalent to a 36% standard deviation increase in CDS innovations. On the other hand, one 
standard deviation increase in  is equivalent to a 20% decrease in CDS innovations. 
The magnitude of the coefficients during the first stress period is also higher compared to the 
                                                 
51 For the purpose of robustness regressions of CDS innovations on 2  and  measures are conducted 
within univariate regression framework as well. The main findings concerning the effect on CDS innovations 
remain unchanged.   
52 CDS innovations are estimated separately for the three considered sub-periods to allow for eventual structural 





second, quiet period, but still much lower compared to the subprime crisis period. Thus, when 
making comparison between two stress regimes, it seems that in the second, CDS prices, in 
addition to default risk, accounted for a high proportion of liquidity risk. These findings are 
consistent with Acharya et al. (2008). In the “clinical study of Ford and GM downgrade”, 
these authors corroborate that the measures of liquidity have little explanatory power in the 
quiet non-downgrade period (R2 of the order of 1% to 3%), but substantial explanatory power 
during the stress downgrade period.  
For the North American region, however, the statistical and economic significance of 
the considered variables is in general the highest during the first stress period. Specifically, 
for the first sub-period, , r and  measures can explain around 6%, 7% and 
4%, respectively, of the variations in daily CDS innovations, whereas the  measure 
is able to explain around 3%. In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation 
increase in the demand pressure ( ,  and  on average) is equivalent to a 27% 
standard deviation increase in CDS innovations. In contrast, for the Period 2, magnitude and 
economic significance of imbalance variables is found to be lower, followed by the 
explanatory power of up to 4%. Interestingly, I do not find significance for any of the 
considered variables during the subprime crisis period, and the model even turns out to be 
misspecified for some of them according to F-statistics. One possible explanation is the 
drastic decrease in the number of available quote and trade entries during the last sub-period 
within the available database, and therefore, due to the scarcity of the data the effect could 




Table 3.12 Regressions on CDS innovations 
 
Table 3.12 reports results obtained from regressing CDS innovations on different imbalance measures ( , , , ), and control variables ( 2 , and 
). Regressions are estimated for the aggregate European (Panel A) and North American (Panel B) market level using daily frequency. Standard errors are calculated as 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
Period 1 Imbt 3.02 ** 2.92 ** -0.58 -1.14 3.37 * 3.90 ** 1.40 ** 1.26 * Period 1 Imbt 2.96 *** 3.09 *** -3.76 *** -3.76 *** 5.98 *** 6.08 *** 1.33 *** 1.66 ***
(2.54) (2.43) (-0.24) (-0.49) (1.90) (2.15) (2.22) (1.73) (4.84) (5.18) (-3.59) (-3.54) (5.33) (5.45) (3.48) (4.26)
T2Qt 4.94 ** 4.88 * 5.16 ** 4.87 ** T2Qt -1.39 -0.47 -1.46 -1.99
(2.03) (1.91) (2.06) (1.97) (-0.91) (-0.21) (-1.00) (-1.28)
TSQPt -1.90 -2.21 TSQPt -2.78 ** -3.88 ***
(-1.03) (-0.77) (-2.42) (-3.23)
adj R 2 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 adj R 2 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06
Period 2 Imbt 1.02 *** 0.76 *** -0.40 -0.43 1.38 *** 1.36 *** 0.74 *** 0.77 *** Period 2 Imbt 2.04 *** 2.03 *** -2.62 *** -2.81 *** 2.49 *** 2.63 *** 1.11 *** 1.11 ***
(4.12) (3.12) (-0.55) (-0.57) (3.69) (3.66) (4.46) (3.67) (5.92) (5.68) (-4.22) (-4.90) (5.66) (5.69) (5.61) (5.55)
T2Qt 0.22 ** 0.35 *** 0.39 *** 0.40 *** T2Qt -0.01 0.24 0.01 0.14
(2.01) (9.52) (11.27) (10.37) (-0.06) (1.35) (0.05) (1.03)
TSQPt -0.66 * -0.42 TSQPt -0.18 -0.60 *
(-1.72) (-0.98) (-0.55) (-1.84)
adj R 2 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 adj R 2 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Period 3 Imbt 21.29 *** 21.07 *** -20.91 *** -20.72 *** 32.09 *** 30.30 *** 9.47 *** 9.69 *** Period 3 Imbt 1.19 1.31 -2.21 -2.30 1.19 1.23 1.95 2.03
(6.07) (6.17) (-4.22) (-4.16) (5.82) (5.96) (5.72) (5.68) (1.15) (1.28) (-1.36) (-1.40) (0.82) (0.82) (1.62) (1.56)
T2Qt 25.50 ** 17.64 26.25 ** 13.98 T2Qt 0.05 0.10 -0.12 -0.07
(2.02) (1.29) (2.02) (1.11) (0.10) (0.21) (-0.25) (-0.21)
TSQPt -3.47 0.91 TSQPt -0.67 -1.06
(-0.86) (0.22) (-0.66) (-0.65)
adj R 2 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.15 adj R 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
All Imbt 3.16 *** 2.95 *** -1.93 ** -1.80 ** 3.51 *** 3.55 *** 1.80 *** 1.81 *** All Imbt 2.13 *** 2.15 *** -2.68 *** -2.82 *** 2.39 *** 2.42 ** 1.83 *** 1.87 ***
(4.70) (4.21) (-2.22) (-2.14) (4.99) (4.94) (5.12) (4.77) (2.98) (3.06) (-2.93) (-3.13) (2.60) (2.46) (2.73) (2.78)
T2Qt 0.34 0.31 *** 0.37 *** 0.44 *** T2Qt 0.09 0.28 -0.07 0.14
(1.20) (2.87) (3.84) (3.46) (0.35) (1.26) (-0.27) (0.69)
TSQPt -0.88 * -0.32 TSQPt -0.14 -0.71 *
(-1.92) (-0.69) (-0.29) (-1.68)
adj R 2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 adj R 2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
Bidder NBA
Panel A: Regressions - Europe Panel B: Regressions - North America
Period Variable BAQ Offerer Bidder NBA VariablePeriod BAQ Offerer
 
 
Table 3.13 Regressions on CDS innovations for investment and non-investment grade sub-samples 
 
Table 3.13 reports results obtained from regressing CDS innovations on different imbalance measures ( , , , ), and control variables ( 2 , and 
). Regressions are estimated for the investment and non-investment grade subsamples for European (Panel A and Panel B) and North American (Panel C and Panel D) 
regions using daily frequency. Standard errors are calculated as Newey-West HAC Standard Errors. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 
5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
All Imbt 2.23 *** 2.27 *** -1.72 *** -1.81 *** 1.93 *** 1.93 *** 1.18 *** 1.28 *** All Imbt 0.73 *** 0.74 *** -1.00 *** -1.02 *** 0.87 *** 0.87 *** 0.51 *** 0.51 ***
(4.78) (4.63) (-3.24) (-3.33) (4.76) (4.76) (5.22) (5.09) (4.35) (4.31) (-3.81) (-3.84) (4.05) (4.04) (4.23) (4.23)
T2Qt 0.52 0.16 0.20 ** 0.24 ** T2Qt 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.04
(0.94) (1.54) (2.34) (2.13) (0.75) (1.52) (0.26) (0.77)
TSQPt -0.16 -0.31 TSQPt -0.05 -0.09
(-0.59) (-1.31) (-0.36) (-0.54)
adj R 2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 adj R 2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
All Imbt 2.59 ** 2.43 ** -1.07 -1.15 4.53 *** 4.54 *** 1.47 *** 1.45 *** All Imbt 1.80 *** 1.72 *** -1.88 ** -1.90 ** 2.57 *** 2.59 *** 1.15 ** 1.19 **
(2.57) (2.34) (-0.66) (-0.70) (3.37) (3.37) (3.11) (2.77) (3.73) (3.65) (-2.52) (-2.52) (3.32) (3.34) (2.18) (2.19)
T2Qt 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.40 T2Qt 0.10 0.23 0.08 0.29
(0.45) (0.44) (0.42) (0.65) (0.61) (0.58) (0.21) (0.42)
TSQPt -2.06 * -2.07 * TSQPt -0.85 -1.24 *
(-1.88) (-1.89) (-1.26) (-1.83)
adj R 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 adj R 2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Panel B: Regressions - non-investment grade European companies Panel D: Regressions - non-investment grade North American companies
Period Variable BAQ Offerer Bidder NBA Period Variable BAQ Offerer NBABidder
Panel A: Regressions - investment grade European companies Panel C: Regressions - investment grade North American companies




For the purpose of robustness, I repeat the analysis for constructed investment and 
non-investment grade indices across the two regions. Results for the overall sample period 
are illustrated in Table 3.13. Essentially, the main findings from regressing CDS innovations 
on imbalance and control measures in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients 
remain the same across the two different rating classes. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 
coefficients seems to be higher for the non-investment grade class, especially for the North 
American region. On the other hand, the explanatory power is somewhat lower for the non-
investment class compared to the investment grade class. 
The previous analysis has been done on the basis of daily CDS innovations. Acharya 
at al. (2008), however, aggregate residuals on a weekly basis to suppress the noise in the data 
and conduct analysis further on weekly basis. If I take the same approach and further 
aggregate the obtained daily innovations to weekly CDS innovations, the explanatory power 
of the imbalance measures in general rises on an aggregate market level. However, for 
robustness purposes, I extend the previous analysis by running firm-specific time-series 
regressions on a weekly basis to obtain firm-specific weekly residuals. For that purpose I 
consider a model in which changes in CDS spreads are regressed on contemporaneous and 
one lag changes in ICSs and one lag changes in CDS spreads:  
         ∆ ∆ ∆ . (3.4)
Further I run univariate and multivariate time-series regression of CDS innovations on 
different imbalance and control variables of the form described in (3.3a) and (3.3b). Given 
that the dataset now turns into a pooled time-series and cross-section unbalanced panel in 
which both firm and time effects are present, standard errors must be corrected for possible 
dependence in residuals. Following Petersen (2009) the firm effect is controlled for in a 





clustered by time period standard errors.53 To avoid the eventual effect of outsiders, firm-
specific weekly observations are included only if both bid and ask quotes are available. The 
coefficients and corresponding t-statistics for the overall sample period and the two 
geographical regions are depicted in Table 3.14. Results are consistent with previous findings 
on an aggregate market level.  
Table 3.14 Regression results 
 
Table 3.14 shows the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from regressing firm-specific CDS innovations 
on different imbalance measures ( , , , ), and control variables (  and 2 ). 
Standard errors are clustered by time and firm dummies are included to control for the firm effect. Regressions 
are estimated using weekly frequency. Weekly firm-specific CDS innovations are obtained by regressing 
changes in CDS spreads on contemporaneous and one lag changes in ICSs, and one lag changes in CDS spreads. 
Number of observations is: 25,268 for European region and 15,678 for North American region. *** indicates 
                                                 
53 Standard errors clustered by time are higher than White standard errors and somewhat higher than standard 
errors clustered by firm.  
Imbt  δimb,t 2.58 *** 2.69 *** -4.30 *** -4.30 *** 6.40 *** 6.44 *** 1.60 *** 1.68 ***
(4.21) (4.97) (-3.23) (-3.23) (5.82) (5.86) (5.40) (5.34)
T2Qt  δt2q,t 0.61 0.52 0.63 0.69
(0.63) (1.32) (1.57) (0.78)
TSQPt  δtsqp,t -2.07 ** -1.42
(-2.04) (-1.40)
adj  R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Imbt  δimb,t 2.74 *** 2.69 *** -3.46 *** -3.46 *** 4.02 *** 3.93 *** 1.87 *** 1.86 ***
(7.47) (7.54) (-6.57) (-6.56) (5.17) (5.17) (4.90) (4.83)
T2Qt  δt2q,t 1.36 1.63 1.29 2.05
(1.10) (1.29) (1.04) (1.22)
TSQPt  δtsqp,t -0.44 -0.65
(-0.64) (-0.78)
adj  R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Panel A: Regressions - Europe
Variable Coefficient
NBA
BAQ Offerer Bidder NBA
Panel B: Regressions - North America
Variable Coefficient BAQ Offerer Bidder




significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. 
Another interesting issue to consider is: up to what extent firm-specific CDS 
innovations are influenced by aggregate, market demand-supply imbalance. To investigate 
this question, I have run a regression in which firm-specific CDS innovations are regressed 
on firm-specific imbalance measures ( ) and aggregate market imbalance ( ).  
    , , , . (3.5)
The results, shown in Table 3.15, reveal that firm-specific CDS innovations are largely 
affected by aggregate market imbalance. This finding could be related with funding 
constraints of sellers in the CDS market.  
Table 3.15 Regression results 
 
Table 3.15 shows the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from regressing firm-specific CDS innovations 
on different firm-specific ( ) and market-wide ( ) imbalance measures ( , , , 
). Standard errors are clustered by time, and firm dummies are included to control for the firm effect. 
Regressions are estimated using weekly frequency. Weekly firm-specific CDS innovations are obtained by 
regressing changes in CDS spreads on contemporaneous and one lag changes in ICSs, and one lag changes in 
CDS spreads. Number of observations is: 25,268 for European region and 15,678 for North American region. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance 
at the 10% level. 
  
Imbi,t  δi,t 1.77 *** -4.80 *** 4.49 *** 1.24 *** Imbi,t  δi,t 1.31 *** -1.83 *** 1.92 *** 1.51 ***
(3.54) (-4.43) (4.95) (4.52) (3.38) (-3.78) (3.03) (4.66)
Imbm,t  δm,t 11.35 *** -3.99 8.95 *** 1.46 *** Imbm,t  δm,t 17.96 *** -13.83 ** 16.60 *** 4.35 ***
(3.75) (-0.42) (2.82) (3.77) (5.82) (-3.44) (4.12) (5.08)
adj  R2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 adj  R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Panel A: Regressions - EuropePanel A: Regressions - Europe





3.5.2 Robustness checks 
To ensure the robustness of the presented findings several additional analyses are 
conducted. First, I consider a model in which changes in CDS spreads are regressed on 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in fundamentals (ICS), lagged changes in CDS 
spreads, and contemporaneous and lagged changes in different imbalance measures ( ). 
Namely, I consider the following model:  
  ∆ ∆ ∆ , ∆ , (3.6)
as well as its extension with the 2  and  control variables. Results from the 
regressions estimated using daily frequency on aggregate market level (i.e. using  and  indices) for the overall period across the European and North American regions are 
reported in Table 3.16. The signs of the significant coefficients are consistent with previous 
findings. The increase in the demand pressure proxied by positive changes in , r, 
and  measures, is positively related with changes in CDS spreads. In contrast, increased 
supply proxied by positive changes in the  measure is negatively related with 
changes in CDS spreads. 
  




Table 3.16 Regression results 
 
Table 3.16 reports results obtained from regressing changes in CDS spreads on contemporaneous and lagged 
changes in fundamentals (ICS), lagged changes in CDS spreads, contemporaneous and lagged changes in 
different imbalance measures ( , , , ), and contemporaneous and lagged changes in 
control variables ( 2 , and ). Regressions are estimated using daily frequency on aggregate market level 
(i.e. using  and  indices) for the overall period across the European (Panel A) and North American 
(Panel B) regions. Number of observations is: 1,739 for European region and 1,714 for North American region. 
Standard errors are calculated as Newey-West HAC Standard Errors. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, 
** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
  
∆ICSt‐k, k=0,...,5 Σβt‐k 0.56 *** 0.56 *** 0.58 *** 0.58 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 *** 0.54 *** 0.54 ***
(6.80) (6.74) (7.03) (7.03) (6.73) (6.74) (6.70) (6.65)
∆CDSt‐k, k=1,...,5 Σγt‐k 0.41 *** 0.42 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.42 *** 0.42 *** 0.42 ***
(5.39) (5.38) (5.23) (5.23) (5.35) (5.35) (5.44) (5.44)
∆Imbt‐k, k=0,...,5 Σδimb,t‐k 15.31 *** 14.50 *** -20.34 *** -19.65 *** 22.01 *** 21.49 *** 7.94 *** 7.97 ***
(3.64) (3.36) (-3.21) (-3.13) (3.50) (3.41) (4.03) (3.73)
∆T2Qt‐k, k=0,...,5 Σδt2q,t‐k -5.77 -4.97 -7.15 -4.95
(-0.95) (-0.82) (-1.23) (-0.78)
∆TSQPt‐k, k=0,...,5 Σδtsqp,t‐k -2.18 -0.37
(-0.59) (-0.10)
adj  R2 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36
∆ICSt‐k, k=0,...,5 Σβt‐k 0.49 *** 0.48 *** 0.50 *** 0.50 *** 0.49 *** 0.49 *** 0.50 *** 0.49 ***
(8.73) (8.64) (8.97) (8.89) (8.68) (8.64) (9.09) (8.98)
∆CDSt‐k, k=1,...,5 Σγt‐k 0.42 *** 0.42 *** 0.42 *** 0.42 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.42 *** 0.42 ***
(7.85) (7.83) (7.87) (7.86) (7.65) (7.62) (7.92) (7.88)
∆Imbt‐k, k=0,...,5 Σδimb,t‐k 6.24 *** 6.21 *** -8.30 *** -8.84 *** 9.75 *** 9.80 *** 4.00 *** 4.19 ***
(4.62) (4.60) (-3.67) (-3.91) (4.35) (4.33) (3.95) (4.06)
∆T2Qt‐k, k=0,...,5 Σδt2q,t‐k 1.46 2.72 0.35 0.83
(0.73) (1.41) (0.19) (0.44)
∆TSQPt‐k, k=0,...,5 Σδtsqp,t‐k -1.09 -2.74
(-0.53) (-1.28)
adj  R2 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Panel B: Regressions - North America
Variable Coefficient BAQ Offerer Bidder NBA
Panel A: Regressions - Europe





The other valid approach would be to consider deviations from long-run equilibrium 
relationship between CDS and ICS series. If we depart from the idea that CDS spreads and 
ICSs price credit risk equally in the long run, then we can apply the cointegration approach 
and explore the transitory movements in CDS spreads. Given that CDS spread series are 
integrated of order 1 (denoted I(1)), innovations in CDS spreads contain at least one 
permanent component which should be directly associated with permanent changes in 
fundamentals. If there exists a linear combination of CDS spreads and ICSs that is stationary 
(denoted I(0)), then there exists a time-varying long-run equilibrium between employed 
variables. Furthermore, if changes in ICS spreads are only the reflection of permanent 
changes in fundamentals, then transitory changes in CDS spreads (CDS innovations) would 
correspond to changes in cointegrating residuals. 
The presence of cointegration is tested on the basis of the econometric methodology 
developed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1996). If variables are cointegrated 
then they allow the VECM representation, defined shortly as: 
∆ Γ ∆  (3.7)
where  is a 2x1 vector of I(1) time series ( ′ ; ), ∆ 1  is the lag operator, 
Π and Γ  are pxp matrices of coefficients, and  is a constant. The specification that is 
estimated allows a separate drift in VAR and a non-zero mean for the cointegrating relation. 
Summary of the results of the Johansen based cointegration test are presented in Table 3.17. I 
have found significant cointegrating relationships for 93 companies (57.1% of the sample) at 
the 5% significance level and for 107 companies (65.6% of the sample) at the 10% 
significance level. The number of companies with a CDS-ICS cointegrating relationship is 
quite balanced between the two examined regions. A significant cointegration relationship for 




the majority of the examined companies further implies that structural models are able to 
price credit risk in the long-run.  
Table 3.17 Johansen Cointegration Test (Summary results) 
 
This table provides summary results for the Johansen Cointegration Tests for the pairs of ICS – CDS spread 
series. A constant is allowed both in the cointegration equation and in the VAR component of the VECM, 
whereas the number of lags is determined according to the Schwarz Information Criterion. The table reports the 
number of companies in the sample for which the cointegration is detected and the number of companies for 
which it is rejected at the 5% and 10% significance level. 
For the sub-sample of companies with significant cointegrating relationship at the 
10% level, CDS innovations streaming from the cointegrating residuals are first aggregated to 
weekly levels and then related to different imbalance measures ( ). In this way I deal only 
with short-run movements in CDS spreads that are not explained by firm-specific 
fundamentals.54 The regression framework is summarized in equation (3.8). It contains 
contemporaneous and one-period lagged imbalance measures, as well as one-period lagged 
dependent variable as the cointegrating residuals seem to be quite persistent. Also, the 
specified model is extended to account for the corresponding control variables.  
                                                 
54 There is also the option to decompose ICSs into its permanent and transitory (PT) component and to consider 
the PT decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Strictly speaking, under the PT decomposition, the 
hypothesis made in this paper is the same as assuming that the CDS market is the only market that adjusts to the 
long-run equilibrium. This is not such an unreasonable assumption given that the major part of credit risk 
discovery occurs in fact in the stock market. Gonzalo and Granger’s (GG) contributions of stock market to the 
common factor are 0.62 for the European and 0.64 for the North American region on average (if contributions 
higher than 1 and lower than 0 are not set to 1 and 0 respectively, then contributions are much higher: 0.84 and 
0.74). Moreover, within the European region, for 29 companies (50%) I fail to reject null hypothesis α=0 at the 
5% level and for 44 (75%) at the 1% level. Within the North American region, for 24 companies (50%) I fail to 
reject null hypothesis α=0 at the 5% level and for 37 (77%) at the 1% level. This means that for these companies 
the common factor for the two series reduces to the fundamental ICS series.  
At 5%
Cointegration 50 (54.3%) 43 (60.6%) 93 (57.1%)
No cointegration 42 (45.7%) 28 (39.4%) 70 (42.9%)
At 10%
Cointegration 59 (64.1%) 48 (67.6%) 107 (65.6%)
No cointegration 33 (35.9%) 23 (32.4%) 56 (34.4%)
Series Johansen Cointegration Test





        , , , . (3.8)
Detailed results for the overall sample period and for both the European and North 
American regions, are depicted in Table 3.18. To save space, only the results from the 
reduced model (i.e. without controls) are presented in Table 3.19 where the overall sample is 
divided into three sub-periods. The reported slopes and t-statistics (in parentheses), are 
computed using firm dummies and clustering by time. Results are consistent with previous 
findings and indicate that imbalance measures significantly influence short-run CDS 
transitory movements in the expected direction. Another important and expected finding is 
that the magnitude of the coefficients is in general larger for the sub-periods of credit distress 
(Period 1 and Period 3), implying higher economic significance of imbalance measures 
during bad times. Also, the positive impact of the 2  ratio is confirmed, what is consistent 
with the hypothesis of insider trading in credit derivatives. Finally, it seems that coefficients 
are in general larger for the European sub-sample, implying higher economic impact across 
this region. 
  




Table 3.18 Regression results - cointegrating residuals 
 
Table 3.18 reports the results of the regression of changes in cointegrating residuals as CDS innovations on 
contemporaneous and one-period lagged imbalance measures ( , , , ), (with or 
without) control variables (  and 2 ), and one lag of the dependent variable. Regressions are estimated 
using weekly frequency. Number of observations is: 16,955 for European region and 10,649 for North American 
region. The reported slopes and t-statistics (in parentheses), are computed using firm dummies and clustering by 
Imbt  δimb,t 2.08 *** 2.07 *** -4.26 *** -4.27 *** 6.43 *** 6.47 *** 1.60 *** 1.67 ***
(3.24) (3.34) (-3.35) (-3.36) (4.91) (4.94) (5.09) (4.90)
Imbt‐1  δimb,t‐1 2.55 *** 2.85 *** -1.25 -1.27 3.18 *** 3.18 *** 1.80 *** 1.84 ***
(3.39) (3.86) (-0.93) (-0.95) (2.77) (2.77) (4.85) (4.90)
T2Qt  δt2q,t 0.36 0.53 0.62 0.56
(0.53) (1.38) (1.53) (0.34)
T2Qt‐1  δt2q,t‐1 -0.18 0.33 0.35 -0.25
(-0.14) (0.59) (0.64) (-0.13)
TSQPt  δtsqp,t -2.26 * -1.66
(-1.93) (-1.44)
TSQPt‐1  δtsqp,t‐1 -0.74 -0.16
(-0.67) (-0.15)
CDSinov ,t-1  ηt‐1 0.16 *** 0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 ***
(3.21) (3.20) (3.28) (3.28) (3.23) (3.22) (3.21) (3.20)
adj  R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Imbt  δimb,t 1.64 *** 1.63 *** -1.89 ** -1.90 *** 2.30 ** 2.24 ** 1.19 *** 1.14 ***
(3.38) (3.39) (-2.59) (-2.59) (2.32) (2.28) (3.59) (3.40)
Imbt‐1  δimb,t‐1 3.35 *** 3.31 *** -3.87 *** -3.89 *** 5.09 *** 5.07 *** 1.79 *** 1.80 ***
(5.80) (5.79) (-4.41) (-4.45) (4.74) (4.74) (3.54) (3.55)
T2Qt  δt2q,t 3.33 * 3.60 * 3.19 * 4.18 ***
(1.75) (1.88) (1.68) (2.73)
T2Qt‐1  δt2q,t‐1 0.39 0.82 0.32 1.36
(0.19) (0.39) (0.15) (0.67)
TSQPt  δtsqp,t -0.19 -0.99
(-0.21) (-1.02)
TSQPt‐1  δtsqp,t‐1 -1.00 0.43
(-1.11) (0.45)
CDSinov ,t-1  ηt‐1 0.12 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 ***
(3.28) (3.28) (3.33) (3.33) (3.29) (3.29) (3.09) (3.04)
adj  R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02




Panel B: Regressions - North America






time. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. 
Table 3.19 Regression results - cointegrating residuals 
 
Table 3.19 reports the results of the regression of changes in cointegrating residuals as CDS innovations on 
contemporaneous and one-period lagged imbalance measures (  , , ), and one lag of 
the dependent variable. Regressions are estimated using weekly frequency. The reported slopes and t-statistics 
(in parentheses), are computed using firm dummies and clustering by time. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
Finally, in order to insure the robustness of the results to the way in which daily CDS 
spread observations are constructed, all the analyses conducted in this study are repeated for 
several alternative ways of constructing daily CDS spread observations. The first alternative 
follows the algorithm: if on a given day both bid and ask quotes are present, then CDS spread 
refers to the midpoint of the average bid and average ask quotes; if only the bid (ask) quotes 
are available on a particular day, then the ask (bid) is computed assuming that the relative 
bid-ask spread is equal to the one on the previous most recent day. The second possibility 
refers only to using two-sided quotes when calculating CDS spread observations. The third 
Period 1  δimb,t 4.98 *** -7.39 ** 7.07 ** 3.13 *** Period 1  δimb,t 1.92 ** -2.38 * 4.46 *** 1.61 **
(3.79) (-2.57) (2.31) (3.25) (2.33) (-1.67) (2.74) (2.62)
 δimb,t‐1 2.85 ** -1.06 1.65 2.51 ***  δimb,t‐1 5.60 *** -9.28 *** 9.77 *** 3.40 ***
(2.56) (-0.47) (0.53) (2.80) (5.56) (-5.66) (4.64) (3.55)
 adj  R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  adj  R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Period 2  δimb,t 1.15 *** -0.62 2.14 * 0.65 *** Period 2  δimb,t 1.63 *** -2.22 *** 2.10 *** 0.86 ***
(2.97) (-0.45) (1.96) (3.24) (3.55) (-3.38) (2.84) (3.38)
 δimb,t‐1 1.15 *** 0.33 3.22 *** 0.75 ***  δimb,t‐1 2.48 *** -2.39 *** 4.01 *** 0.89 ***
(3.03) (0.23) (2.65) (3.15) (4.86) (-2.81) (5.65) (3.98)
 adj  R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03  adj  R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Period 3  δimb,t 1.82 -7.89 ** 13.73 *** 3.01 *** Period 3  δimb,t 1.20 0.14 2.89 1.59
(0.89) (-2.39) (3.76) (4.03) (0.55) (0.04) (0.69) (0.85)
 δimb,t‐1 6.57 ** -6.69 ** 8.88 *** 4.15 ***  δimb,t‐1 0.70 3.28 4.09 1.40
(2.30) (-2.63) (2.85) (3.99) (0.22) (0.59) (0.89) (0.75)
 adj  R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04  adj  R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel A: Regressions - Europe (per period) Panel B: Regressions - North America (per period)
BAQ Offerer Bidder NBA BAQ Offerer Bidder NBAPeriod Coefficient CoefficientPeriod




possibility consists of using only realized transaction entries as a reference CDS spread 
observations. Main findings of the study are not materially affected by these different 
specifications.  
3.6 Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis has put doubt on considering CDS spreads as a “pure” 
measure of credit risk by revealing their clear sensitivity to liquidity shocks. To shed light 
upon this issue in this chapter I empirically examine the effect of structural demand-supply 
imbalances on changes in CDS spreads that cannot be attributed to fundamentals. Theoretical 
determinants of credit risk are jointly accounted for by means of theoretical stock market 
implied credit spreads derived on the basis of a structural credit risk model. Data set consists 
of a large and homogenous international sample of 163 non-financial companies (92 
European and 71 North American) with relatively active quotes during the time period 
spanning from 2002-2008.  
The results indicate that short-term CDS price movements, not related to 
fundamentals, are indeed affected by bid and offer imbalance, especially in stress times. An 
increase in the number of buyers as regards sellers, corroborated on the basis of different 
imbalance measures, has an increasing effect on CDS prices. This indicates that CDS spreads 
reflect not only the price of credit protection, but also a premium charged by protection seller 
in situations when it becomes more difficult to offset the taken position. The effect is 
particularly visible within European region during the recent subprime crisis period. The 
results also indicate that matching intensity is positively related with CDS spreads, what is 










Conclusions and Further Research 
 
This thesis treats the estimation and applications of theoretically attractive structural 
credit risk models in the specific context of assessing and analysing the information on credit 
risk embodied in the stock market and market for credit derivatives (CDS market). It is built 
on the idea that, under the structural model framework, information on credit risk can be 
extracted from information on stock prices. Following this basic setting three issues are 
analysed: the relative informational content of stock and CDS market as regards credit risk, 
the problem of estimation of latent model parameters and, finally, the existence of non-
default liquidity components in CDS spreads. The overall research presented in this study 
leads to the sets of conclusions, from theoretical and empirical point of view.  
First, the study contributes to the existing debate on the performance of structural 
credit risk models by demonstrating in several ways that these models are indeed useful for 
credit risk pricing. Namely, it shows that CDS spreads observed in the market can be 
replicated quite well by its theoretical counterparts as long as the appropriate procedure is 
applied when estimating the model parameters. A new procedure, that outperforms other 
options available for structural models with exogenously specified default barrier, has been 
proposed. In addition, the analyses made in the thesis show that theoretical - stock market 
implied credit spreads based on structural models, can explain substantial part of the cross-
sectional variation of the CDS spread levels. The empirical findings also suggest that 
explanatory power of structural models when explaining changes in CDS spreads sharply 
increases during stress periods. Finally, when considering a large time-period for CDS market 
(2002-2008), it seems that theoretical parity relationship between stock and CDS market 




holds as an equilibrium condition for the majority of the cases, implying that these markets 
do price credit risk equally in the long-run.  
Second set of conclusions refers to the short-run context of the relative informational 
content of stock market implied credit spreads and CDS spreads - directly comparable 
indicators of the price of credit risk in two different markets (stock and CDS market). The 
analysis documents time-varying relative informational content of two alternative proxies for 
the same latent variable – “pure” credit spread. Likewise, the analysis suggests that leading 
role of stock market as the source of information as regards credit risk increases with the 
overall credit risk level. This result, however, is not inconsistent with the argument of insider 
trading in credit derivatives; a positive relationship between the frequency of severe credit 
downturns and the probability of the CDS market leading credit risk discovery is 
documented. 
Third set of findings is related to the context of the presence of non-default 
components in CDS spreads traditionally believed to be “pure” measures of credit risk. To 
shed light upon this issue, the effect of demand-supply imbalances on the changes in CDS 
spreads not accounted by fundamentals (ICS) is analyzed. It is shown that this aspect of 
liquidity in the CDS market has important consequences on CDS prices. Namely, it is 
demonstrated that an increase in the number of buyers as regards sellers has an increasing 
effect on CDS prices, and that the protection seller will charge a premium in situations when 
it becomes more difficult to offset the taken position. These findings have direct implication 
for using CDS spreads as a market benchmark when testing the performance of structural 
models. The underperformance of ICSs may not be due to underestimation of credit risk per 
se, but due to the fact that CDS spreads contain non-default components.  
The findings of the study together with the proposed estimation procedure set the 
background for different empirical applications. One possible application lies on the fact that 




the default barrier, along with the value, volatility, and expected return on the firm’s assets, 
are estimated from stock market exclusively. This means that estimation of model parameters 
referred above is possible even in the cases when the information from CDS market is 
unavailable or unreliable. As a result, CDS market could be used to calibrate certain model 
parameters that are usually assumed to be exogenously fixed in empirical applications. More 
specifically, this is the case of the recovery rate parameter. Estimation of CDS implied 
recovery rates would allow for the investigation of the informational content of the CDS 
market on this key parameter.  
Credit spreads are determined by probabilities of default and recovery rates. Although 
the specification of recovery rate is one important determinant of the credit spread level, most 
of the empirical applications of structural models assume exogenously fixed recovery rates in 
order to assess credit spreads. Recovery rates are usually set to average historical rate of 40% 
or 51.31% (Ericsson et al. 2007, Huang and Huang, 2003) or adjusted to historical rates by 
industry (Alonso et al., 2008). Still, there are studies that suggest the existence of cyclical 
interdependence between probabilities of default and recovery rates. For example, Altman 
(2006) finds negative correlation between default rates and recovery rates. This means that 
CDS spreads will not reflect only the probabilities of default but also the changing 
expectations of recovery in the case of default. Namely, CDS spreads are market prices 
dependent on assumption on recovery rates and therefore should reflect market participant’s 
expectations about its developments. For example, in bad times, when probabilities of default 
across reference entities rise, it is likely that recovery rates that investors exposed to credit 












The Forte (2009) Methodology 
The market value of total assets at any time , , is assumed to evolve according to 
the continuous diffusion process 
, (A.1)
where  is the expected rate of return on asset value,  is the fraction of the asset value paid 
out to investors,  is the asset return volatility, and  is a standard Brownian motion. Default 
occurs whenever   reaches a specific critical point , defined in this case as a fraction  of 
the nominal value of the total debt . With this modification of the original Leland and Toft 
(1996) model, at any , the value of a bond with maturity , principal , and coupon , 
will be expressed as: 
     , 1 1 , (A2) 
where  is the risk-free rate, 0,1  represents the bankruptcy costs, and 
        Φ Φ , 
        Φ Φ , 
with, 
√ ; √ ; 





2 ;              ln ; 2 .       
 The total value of the debt  will be equal to the sum of all individual bonds 
outstanding. Accordingly, for  issued bonds with  being the maturity of the n–th bond, 
the total value of debt will be: 
, . (A.3)
Finally, the total market value of the equity  will be expressed as: 
| 0 , (A.4)
where | 0  is the value of the total debt when bankruptcy costs equal zero. This 
expression follows from the reasoning that the presence of bankruptcy costs affects only 
creditors.   
Credit Spread Estimation 
The theoretical credit spread at time  is determined as the premium from issuing at 
par value a hypothetical bond with the same maturity as the corresponding CDS contract – in 
this case, 5 years. This bond is assumed to pay a coupon 5, , so that the following 
equation holds: 
         , 5| . (A.5.a)
Accordingly, the bond yield is 
             5 5, , (A.5.b)
and consequently the theoretical credit spread is determined as the difference between the 







Volatility, bankruptcy costs, and the default point indicator, are assumed to be 
constant. The nominal value of total debt  is approximated with the sum of short ( ) and 
long-term liabilities ( : 
; 1, … . , . (A.6)
The pay-out rate, , is expressed as the ratio of interest and dividend payments to the total 
asset value at ,  
; 1, … . , . (A.7)
In order to determine | 0 , it is assumed that at each point , the company has 
10 bonds: one with a maturity of one year and face value equal to , and nine with 
maturities from 2 to 10 years, each with a face value equal to 1/9 of . The coupon of 
each bond is determined as the fraction of  proportional to the weight of its face value 
relative to the face value of total debt. The risk-free rate for each bond is fixed according to 
the swap rate for the corresponding maturity.  
For an assumed initial arbitrary value of , constant volatility  and the series of total 
firm assets value  are simultaneously estimated on the basis of the following algorithm:  
1) Proposing an initial value for , ; 
2) Estimating  series using the information on the stock market capitalization , so 
that (A.4) holds for all ; 
3) Estimating new volatility  from the obtained  series; 
4) End of the process if . Otherwise,  is proposed at step 1.  





In line with Leland (2004), bankruptcy costs are assumed constant and equal to 0.3. As a result, different ICS series can be estimated on the basis of equation (A.5), 
depending on the value imposed for the default point indicator, . In order to calibrate this 
value, the following relationship between ICS and CDS series is assumed:  
, (A.8)
where  are i.i.d. error terms with 0 and . Consequently, the Mean 
Squared Error (MSE) becomes the natural measure of discrepancy between credit spread 
series.  
1 . (A.9)
Finally, the default point indicator  is determined such that the divergence between 
credit spread series is minimized:  
. (A.10)
Appendix B 
The derivative of the transformation ; ,  is given by: ; , | 0; , 1 | 0; , , (B.1)
where 










with 1 . 
Appendix C 
 In this case we provide exact expressions for  and : 2 2 Φ ; (C.1)
2 . (C.2)
Appendix D 
The equity pricing equation in Brockman and Turtle (2003) is given by: 
Φ Φ √ Φ  
Φ √ , (D.1)
where 






ln 2√ ,ln 2√ ,
 
and 12.  
For tractability purposes, and in line with other empirical studies, rebate of zero for the 
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